

1st INFANTRY DIVISION
Ardennes-Eupen Sector
16-31 Dec 44

A varied collection of material on the fifteen day operation of the Division in blunting enemy attack. Narrative by historian provides a continuous account at Division level. The one interview is at battalion level with some account of small unit action.

Division Narrative by historian 22 pages

Interview

Pages

2d Bn, 26th Inf, CO, Ex O, S-2, S-3,

Cos E, F, G

and Comd Offs

10

Extracts from official documents and overlays, including a detailed report on TD actions in the battle.

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~~GL-182~~

THE GERMAN BREAKTHROUGH

16 December 1944--16 January 1945.

(V CORPS SECTOR--FIRST U.S. ARMY)

FIRST U. S. INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE BREAKTHROUGH

16-31 December 1944.

CLASSIFIED BY *[redacted]* ON *[redacted]* DECLASSIFIED TO:
 BY AUTHORITY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

Cancelled
Robert M. Freeman
15 Apr 46

M/Sgt. F. C. Pogue

T/3 J. M. Topete

V Corp

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THE BREAKTHROUGH
(17-21 Dec. 1944)

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BUTGENBACH ACTION

2d Bn, 26th Inf, 1st Inf. Div.

Joint Interview: Lt. Col. Derrill Daniel, CO 2d Bn.
Maj. Walter W. Nations, Exec Off.
Capt. Thomas J. Gendron, S-3.
Lt. Elmer C. Killens, S-2.
Capt. Pierre Stepanian, Co CO Co E.
1/Lt. August T. McColgan, Co CO G Co.
1/Lt. James E. Rea, F Co CO.

Bn CP, southwest of Bütgenbach (Dom Bütgenbach), 14 January 1945.
(Capt. Gendron called in all the company commanders to help with the interview. He outlined the main points of the story, but had the commanders to tell their part. All of the battalion officers kept close check on the story and added points as the interview progressed).

Overlays: GSGS 4414, Sheet 5503, 2d Ed., 5503, Elsenborn. 2 sketches by T/3 Jose M. Topete, from material furnished by S-3 and Company officers in the interview.

Interviewers: M/Sgt. Forrest C. Pogue and T/3 Jose M. Topete (V Corps).
(The early part of the story was given by Capt. Gendron.)

Just prior to the breakthrough the 26th Infantry was at AUBEL, Belgium, reorganizing and training after the HURTGEN Forest action in which it had been hard hit. Two companies had been completely knocked out (E and F Cos were completely new). The companies had been brought up to about 100 men each, about 60% strength. G Co had not been brought to full strength and started from AUBEL with only about 50 men. Thus G Co had about 10-15% replacements, while E and F Cos were 90% replacements (others back from hospital). Two heavy MG platoons were completely new except for 8 men. Officer ranks were depleted; In the Whole Battalion there were only 7 old officers (four officers in Hq and 2 in the line who came in on D Day). There were only about 4 BAR's to a company, but the battalion was

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not short any of the heavy guns. It was short on grenade launchers and lacked two jeeps.

The 26th Infantry was alerted on the morning of 16 December. At 2100 it was put on 1 hour alert and at 2200 got definite orders to move. It started moving at 2400 to Camp Elsenborn. (0300 given as actual time of departure from another source). There^(at Cp. Elsenborn) the Regiment was grabbed by the Asst CG, 99th Division, since the 26th Infantry was attached^c to the 99th Division. The Regimental Commander of the 26th Infantry ordered his troops through Bütgenbach to seize high points at 928027 and 940026. The 3d Bn was to occupy the high ground to the north of the 2nd^{Bn.} After hitting Bütgenbach they came down the main road (see overlay^{#1}) towards Dom^M Bütgenbach. On the first high ground the 2d Bn found approximately 50 men of the 99th Division not dug in. They were under a TD Captain (apparently Capt. Kennedy of 612th TD Bn.), who came back three times reporting Germans. He had clerks, mechanics, etc., with him. He was finally told not to come back any more until the 26th Infantry could go through. (At this point Capt. Gendron indicated that many elements of the 99th Div had withdrawn without firing at Germans and without attempting to save their guns and vehicles).

In the advance G Co, with attached tanks, took the lead and came down to the high ground at approximately 937022 (see overlay^{#1}). Co F took up positions to the south of G Co. E Co secured positions south of Dom^M Butgenbach (see overlay^{#1}).

There was no infantry opposition on the part of the Germans to the taking up of positions by the 26th Infantry. The Germans apparently had not expected a quick move on the part of the American forces and had failed to hasten forward from Bullingen. If they had taken this area it would have aided them to get the road

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net they wanted through Bütgenbach towards Elsenborn. The enemy threw some artillery and mortar fire in on the 26th at night, but it was not serious. The 2d Bn CP was set up in the building which it was still occupying on the 14th of January (see overlay #1).

✓ 57MM AT Guns were put on the roads to the east and the south (see overlay #1). The Bn. had 1 platoon of 4 M-10 TD'S (from the 2d Platoon, Co A, 634th TD Bn) and the tanks of 2d platoon, Co C, 745th Tk Bn. The men dug in immediately since it was getting dark (all this was on 17 December). The Bn. had moved out of Elsenborn at 1200 and had arrived at Bütgenbach at 1300. The Bn. Commander waited for orders there. The Bn. occupied its positions about 1700 of 17 December. (It was noted here that some of the times given in the G-2 Periodical Report and After Action Report were as much as 4 hours wrong; it was also noted that in a few cases there might be a confusion in days. Everybody concerned discussed the matter of time each time an hour was mentioned and an attempt was made to give more accurate hours than those which occur in some of the reports). There was no enemy air activity during this period.

Patrols were then sent into Bullingen and into the woods south of Bütgenbach by the 2d Bn. There were some Germans in the town and some activity on the crossroads to the south of Dom Bütgenbach. The gap between E and F Cos was patrolled all night. There was no mining the first night, since the Bn. depended on AT Guns, bazookas and the like.

About 1000 on 18 December the 2d Bn. decided to extend its lines. E Co was spread rather thin to the west of the north south road out of Dom Bütgenbach. During the 18th the Germans began to probe with infantry and tanks to feel out the position, using two platoons with 2 tanks each. A reconnaissance car which came up

near Dom Bütgenbach on the 18th, was knocked out resulting in the killing of three and the wounding of a fourth German. They were from the 12th SS Panzer Division (nearly their full strength was in this area after the first day plus elements of 3d Parachute Division). The Bn. later met elements of 12th Volksgrenadier Division and then the 89th Division (which was still there on the 14 Jan 45).

The 2d Bn was covering an 1800 yard front, with its rear and right flanks exposed. It had run into parachutists of Col. Von der Heydte's group coming out from Elsenborn. Germans had occupied Bullingen on 17 December and had sent patrols towards Bütgenbach. They had excellent observation for artillery (about 90%); while the 2d Bn had one blind spot near Dom Bütgenbach.

The Division Artillery had the mission of blocking roads and approaches. The 2d Bn did not have this support at first, the delay in moving out of Bütgenbach southward by the 26th Inf ^{being} due to Divisional orders that the advance be held up until the arty. could start displacement. By 1430 on 17 December, however, the Bn. had the support of its organic battalion---33d FA Bn (105's).

(Statement by Capt. Gendron and Capt Stepanian).

Capt. Gendron--First attack was on the night of the 18-19 Dec (there is some difference of opinion as to the time). 12 tanks and 2 companies of infantry came in from the east (see overlay) ^{#1}. A total of 7 tanks came almost to the Battalion's position. They were hit by bazookas, 57MM AT guns and AT Grenades. Three tanks got through the lines and came up and down the road south of Dom Butgenbach and then went back. Three attacks were made altogether.

Capt Stepanian--The first counterattack came at 0225 on the morning of the 19 December. ^{twenty} 20 Truckloads of infantry and several tanks hit E Co. Trucks unloaded on SW road at (933008).

They had probably found a weak point to the east of the road. However, the Bn had arty direct fire ^{plus mortar fire} blocking that point. ~~plus mortar fire~~. Direct arty fire broke up attack. Three tanks finally got through and ran up and down road going into Dom Bütgenbach putting direct fire on the Bn. Five or six men in Dom Bütgenbach hit by enemy tank fire. The tanks, driven back by artillery and infantry, stopped at line of departure (patrols later found about 100 enemy dead). It was believed that two of the three tanks were hit (2 found disabled later).

Stepanian, E Co---At 1010 on 19 Dec 2 tanks ^{and} a company of infantry of the 12th SS Panzer Division came in from the south, ran through the Bn positions and blasted them. Several of E Co men were wounded. Arty and TD fire from near Dom Butgenbach was brought in while the men stayed in the foxholes. One of their tanks was knocked out and their infantry stopped cold by this fire. It is probable that all of the infantry in this attack was killed.

Lt. Rea---At 0130 20 December an attack developed from Bullingen. ^{They} came up east-west road. About six tanks (I saw 6 tanks--Rea) and about two companies of infantry (at least normal strength). They hit the roadblock of mines which had been laid the night of 18 Dec--belt of mines across the road). The rest of the tanks then went off the road to the left and came crosscountry to the north-south road into Dom Bütgenbach. It was dark, so it was impossible for the Bn to see how to shoot. The Germans fired into F Co, knocking out three bazooka teams. Co H lost a machine gun section and 4 or 5 men wounded. The Germans had no arty preparation for the attack.,

12th SS Panzer Division decided to attack again. On the night of 20 Dec G Co of the 2nd Bn was moved to the right of Co E,

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while F Co tied in with the 3d Bn. The right flank was still open. The 1st Bn was in Bütgenbach. A Co was on extreme right. Direct fire from friendly artillery from the north was placed on the highway to the south. At 0615 on 20 Dec the 2nd Bn contacted force of tanks and a Bn of infantry--2d Bn of 25 Panzergrenadier Rgt, 12th SS Pz Div. They were reinforced by additional infantry--elements of Para Rgt, 3d Bn of 12th SS Tk Rgt. A document captured later from the enemy shows that they suffered heavy losses in this attack. The attack stopped by 0815; 8 tanks knocked out at least (This material was given us from personal notes of the S-3. Comparison with the G-2 report of the Division indicated definitely that the story of the 26th Inf in that report was taken from the same notes).

(S-3 and three Co Cmdrs gave this story)/.

On the morning of 21 Dec a ^U small combat patrol was sent out by the enemy at 0330. The patrol of about 20 men was driven back by mortar fire. This attack was from the south. About 0500 a larger force came out of the woods but was stopped by arty, mortar and small arms fire. At 0715 a larger force of about 12 tanks and a Bn of Inf (reinforced) attacked. The outposts saw them coming out of the woods and called for arty and 57 MM AT gun fire which drove them back for a few minutes but they came back again. The 2d Bn had about 4 battalions of arty firing. There tanks got through the fire and Infantry overran the Bn outposts but didn't get far. They ^{#2} three tanks came through a gap in the hedgerow (see overlay) and two went up and down the south side firing into foxholes, seeking for automatic weapons in particular. They got all of them--a section of heavy MG's, a section of light MG's and 2 BAR'S and also put direct fire on the two AT guns.

The Bn. directed direct arty and bazooka fire on the tanks knocking out one tank with a bazooka. The bazooka man's assistant was wounded so he loaded and fired the bazooka by himself. (The Co Cmdr didn't know the man's name; said he was trying to get the name so he could recommend him for an award). During the ~~fight~~ ^{fight} one tank came through a gap in the 500 yard hedgerow. Tank commander stopped at one foxhole, got out, waved his pistol, and one American came out and got into the tank as a prisoner. Another tank joined this one soon afterwards and the two came up towards Dom Bütgenbach. One tank was behind G Co and the other behind E. Pistol shots were heard at one point and it was thought that tank commanders were shooting American wounded. However, no infantry got beyond hedgerows. They got 8 of Co E men on the right flank and about 24 men were reported missing from Co G. The Bn counted 8 of their tanks burning--knocked out by bazookas and AT guns. An 81 MM mortar got one of them.

The attack subsided about 1530 or 1600.

(Lt McColgan gave the material which follows):

A reorganization of the remnants of G Co was effected. C Co was brought up to the right. G Co suffered the following casualties: 13 KIA, 12 MIA and 10 WIA. One platoon leader wounded, 2 squad leaders KIA and 2 WIA. One platoon sergeant was out for combat exhaustion and 3-4 assistant squad leaders out. At beginning of fight the Co had 68 riflemen on the line and a MG section of 9 men. A mortar section at Dom Butgenbach fired 750 rounds from its two mortars during this attack, firing until the tanks caved in their holes with direct hits.

When the tanks broke through towards the CP of Co E the CP group rallied to form a new line. As three tanks came up in front of the building, a bazooka team from Co G went to their ^{barns} nearby.

in an effort to get into firing position but were unable to do so.

Company E--Capt Stepanian

Co E was confronted by the 3 tanks which pushed G around and exposed the E Co flank. The tanks hit about a half platoon of E Co men on the right flank hitting one of the 57 MM AT guns on the right and a squad of men about 0800 or 0900. The left half of the line (on the east) stood firm for 2 hours. When they saw tanks in DOM Butgenbach near the E Co CP they started in that direction. The three tanks were firing into the CP. After a time an American tank located north of Dom Bütgenbach destroyed one of the enemy tanks in front of the CP. Another tank firing into the CP was knocked out at 1600. The remaining tank taking cover behind the two knocked out tanks, blew two holes in the CP, hitting about 9 CP personnel. The men could not move around the road at this time, because any movement drew MG fire from tanks. Later the men were sent out to occupy nearby buildings. No enemy infantry got through artillery screen to bother ^{them} us. The effectiveness of this screen may be seen in patrol reports which indicated there were 500 enemy dead in front of the Bn line.

About 1600 the 90 MM gun near the CP brought fire on a German tank. The gun fired at the long building and with three shots chased the tank away from it. The Bn kept the buildings. It is known that the Bn got 11 of the 12 tanks and may have disabled the other one. Co E had 3 KIA, 12 MIA, 15 WIA. Lost weapons platoon leader, four squad leaders, 3 assistant squad leaders.

Co E ran short on mortar ammunition during the fight and sent a jeep after more but it could not get back down the road. Approximately 7500 rounds of 81 MM mortar ammunition were used in the fight. Arty fired 12,000 rounds that day (a division record). Fire

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was placed directly on positions of 2nd Bn troops who were well dug in. There was fog all morning and no observation. The regiment had the support of 8 battalions of medium and light arty during the fight. Four 90 MM guns were also attached in this action. The Bn called for medium battalion on gap in hedgerow and got continuous fire from 955th (155's) from 0900-2400 on 21 December.

(Capt Gendron takes up story again with aid of Major Nations).

The outposts on the east were out pretty far; they were also placed on west to edge of woods. They heard the enemy moving when they ^{Germans} didn't suspect that they were being observed. OP's picked up this information immediately and brought down direct fire.

Infantry-tank coordination of Germans was perfect until they hit arty fire (Lt Rea). After second attack on 21 Dec the 2d Bn put in 2400 mines along its whole front. Mines had also been placed on the eastern flank on the 20th of December. Germans attacked on 21st through gap that was unmined. The Bn position was strengthened with 2 strong road blocks, with mines on road and with three rows of concertina wire.

The Bn captured some interesting material on the arty activities of the enemy when it picked up a FO party one night. Four out of 8 were captured, two killed and two escaped. Despite this loss of observers they managed to put 800 rounds in buildings at Dom Butgenbach. They destroyed all of the Bn's wire; during a big attack communications couldn't be repaired, so the Bn had to depend on radio. Enemy arty worked on the area NW of Butgenbach first and tried to get the Div arty. On the day before the attack of 21 Dec they fired all day.

They had an overlay which showed 2 of their battalions 4000 yds from the front.

The 2nd Bn made its men dig in deep; they covered
the holes with logs and sandbags. This precaution saved the Bn.
when the attack began and friendly fire was brought down on the
positions.

There was no rain or snow during the action, but

there were heavy fog and ground mist.

Bullingen was pretty badly blasted during the fight.

The Germans made error in not hastening to occupy Dom Butgenbach
since they would have given ^{the Bn} considerable trouble. At one time,
however, V Corps wanted the Bn to withdraw to Butgenbach; but a
protest was made since it would have lost a good position.

3 Co came in on 21st to right flank (west). Got

about 150 replacements ^{the Bn} after 21 December.

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1st Inf Div.

Excerpts From Report After Action
16 -- 31 Dec.

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PHASE III - RESTORATION AND DEFENSE OF THE
BUTGENBACH-WEYWERTZ-WEIMES SECTOR.

1. MISSION

a. Operations Memorandum Number 132, Headquarters VII Corps, dated 16 December, stated that the 1st US Infantry Division will be prepared to move on six hours notice beginning 161330A on orders Commanding General, VII Corps.

Regimental Combat Team 26 will move to the vicinity of CAMP ELSENBORN (K-9008) 17 December 1944 and is attached to V Corps effective 162400A.

Regimental Combat Team 16 (less the 2d Battalion and the 7th Field Artillery Battalion) is detached from V Corps and reverts to VII Corps and the 1st US Infantry Division effective 11 December 1944. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry is detached from V Corps and reverts to VII Corps and the 1st US Infantry Division effective 13 December 1944. The 7th Field Artillery Battalion is detached from V Corps and reverts to VII Corps and the 1st US Infantry Division effective 151200A December 1944.

The 5th Field Artillery Battalion is detached from V Corps and reverts to VII Corps and the 1st US Infantry Division effective 151600A.

b. See map: FRANCE and BELGIUM, GSGS 4040, 1/50,000, Sheets 59 and 70 and map: GERMANY, GAGA 4414, 1/25,000, Sheets 5502 and 5503.

c. See Appendix A - Troop List, 18 December 1944.

e. See Appendix C - Sketch Map, 1/100,000, showing Division Positions, 1-31 1944.

f. See Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

2. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The leading battalion of Combat Team 26 left at 170230A for an assembly area in the vicinity of LAGER (CAMP) ELSENBORN. Combat Team 26 closed in that area at 0900A.

At 0900A, the Division received a teletype from VII Corps which stated that effective 162400A Combat Team 26 was detached from VII Corps and attached to V Corps. The Division was told to move Combat Team 16 immediately to CAMP ELSENBORN at K-9009. This teletype was a confirmation of telephone instructions.

The Division command post opened at 873093 in the vicinity of SOURBRODT, BELGIUM at 172000A. The Division was attached to V Corps.

At 2010A, the Division told the 26th Infantry, "As soon as we get tied in, we are going to take you over. Haven't got much support. Would like to get the picture of what you are doing." The regiment replied, "We have two battalions to the south and a little bit east of BUTGENBACH - a hill mass. The 1st Battalion is at ELSENBORN; he is getting "G" Company, 26th Infantry tonight. The 26th has a great variety of anti-aircraft weapons a company of towed TDs, and a platoon of other TDs. We are more or less on our own. Situation is somewhat mixed up. Have no contact with enemy at present. The 33rd FA Bn is on the right of the 1st Battalion."

The Division told the 26th Infantry, "The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry will be south of RJ by MALMEDY; the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry will go south of that town; the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry will go southeast of that. One combat team of the 30th Division will pass through the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry will reinforce the 99th Division. Situation at MONSCHAU is quiet. At the present time, hold what you have; watch your right flank. We will have the 16th come on down with the people on the right. The 5th Field Artillery Battalion will probably come in tonight. Keep us posted."

By 2040A, the Division had told V Corps, "We want to take the 26th Infantry over. We have communication with them. They are a little worried about the right flank. Information hazy on the 99th Division; we have a liaison officer there." V Corps replied that the 18th Infantry was in position just east of EUPEN. Corps also stated that they would inform the Division when they would take over the 26th Infantry. The 26th Infantry reported at 2058A that their regimental command post was at 912044.

The Division told the 99th Infantry Division at 2105A, "The 47th Infantry holds MUTZENICH. MONSCHAU is clear of the enemy. 18th Combat Team is now east of EUPEN in position to back up the 47th Infantry. The 16th Infantry is going in about 8213; the 3d Battalion is moving now and should be in before 12 o'clock. One combat team of the 30th Division is moving through the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and is moving down to MALMEDY. Have requested Corps for release of the 26th Infantry to us since we are in this sector. Last plan was that the rest of the 30th Division would go on down to bring them to the right of us."

The 1st Reconnaissance Troop reported at 2145A that their command post was at 814147; the 3d Platoon was at 802116-803162; the 1st Platoon was at 6021-0260; the 2d Platoon was at 814147-100085 and the troop was patrolling from the command post to 802116. At 2200A, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, at the

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Rear Division Command post in the vicinity of HAJSET, told the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, at the forward Division command post in the vicinity of SOURBRODT, BELGIUM, that the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion had not been able to move yet; only one battalion of the 16th Infantry had cleared at 1900A and they were being strafed by German planes; the 30th Infantry Division was moving on the road.

V Corps told the Division at 2205A that they had told the 18th Infantry that enemy forces estimated as high as 500 were dug-in at K-8116 and these forces would be mopped up by the Division. The 33d Field Artillery Battalion was told that the 5th Field Artillery movement was slowed up due to enemy strafing and the battalion was not to be expected in until very late tonight or early tomorrow morning. The 33d Field Artillery Battalion replied, "The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry is patrolling aggressively; now hold valuable ground. We are firing on stuff moving along 965991 to 925986 to 904993; estimated as much as a division. Would like to know how soon we can get assistance from the 5th Field Artillery Battalion, as Corps is pretty well tied up."

At 2303A, the 18th Infantry told the Division, "Request clarification of orders. Have received orders from Corps to make a reconnaissance in the morning in the area grid 8116 in which 500 enemy paratroopers are reported to be dug-in; reconnaissance in force from our present positions south of LUPEN. At the same time, a battalion from the 16th Infantry (8213) is to send a force to the north to make a reconnaissance in force. After that has been accomplished, the 16th Infantry is to destroy the enemy. We haven't received orders from your headquarters."

By 2344A, the Division had told the 18th Infantry, "On the coordination tomorrow, suggest you send the unit forward with radio communication; report their progress to me. I'll in turn get the 16th Infantry to get them to report to me. Best way to tie it in. Wiping them out with artillery will come through later. Use direct fire. We hope we can get you people down here; have something for a counter-attack force. Your tanks will be on the way the first thing in the morning." The 18th Infantry told the Division that they would have the 3d Battalion notify Division Headquarters of their progress. The regiment also said that they had sent a liaison officer to Combat Command "R" and to the 47th Infantry; the whole of Combat Team 47 had passed through their last battalion and had detrucked four miles east at 820428.

3. OPERATIONS
a. 18 December 1944

At 0025A, the 18th Infantry told the Division that they would like to make the 17 line their objective while the 16th Infantry would have the 16 line; the regiment was sending a reinforced company supported by the Cannon Company. The 16th Infantry

was reported as sending north a reinforced platoon. At 0030A, the 16th Infantry reported that the 1st Battalion and the 3d Battalion, less tank destroyers and three anti-tank guns, had closed in the area. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was reported as having closed in its area at 0120A. The 16th Infantry reported at 0450A that elements of the 30th Infantry Division commenced to pass through them at 0130^A and they were still passing through.

At 0545^A, the 16th Infantry told the Division, "Motorized patrol returned from MALMEDY and reported that the 291st Engineer Battalion and the 99th Infantry Battalion are in there. Enemy is two miles east of the town. Elements of the 30th Infantry Division are on the way there now passing through the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry." The 26th Infantry stated at 0640A that Company "E" had a brush with an enemy patrol west and a little north of the regimental position.

At 0807^A, Division Artillery reported that the 7th Field Artillery Battalion closed in at 0600A. The 18th Infantry reported at 0830^A that their task force jumped off at 0735^A and they were walking and moving slowly. It reached the 20 grid line at 0840^A and contacted no enemy. By 0840^A, the 16th Infantry had told the Division, "The 3d Battalion will cover area which generally extends along the stream that comes from the lake over the north of WEYWERTZ; they are cutting all roads there; will take place in morning. Left one company in ROBERTVILLE with the mission of covering bridge and being reserve. The 1st Battalion extends generally around BUSBACH; The 2d Battalion is in all around defense of the RJ."

The 26th Infantry reported at 1100^A that the threat was still in the north and northeast and they were firing in the woods at tanks at 923013. The Division told the 26th Infantry that they had the backing of two tank destroyer battalions which were south of CAMP ELSENBORN. At 1235^A, the Division told V Corps, "The 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry went in to WEYWERTZ and found ack-ack installations; went south to the road in a jeep and then went west. WEIMES found and re-captured the 47th Evacuation Hospital. We are ordering personnel out of that hospital and will try to reorganize that ground."

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion was told at 1255^A to move one company immediately to the town of WEIMES and cover an all around defense there. The battalion was also told to tie in with the 16th Infantry by radio and the Division wanted to evacuate the 47th Evacuation and Field Hospital and other American installations. By 1415^A, the 18th Infantry had told the Division that they were going to be relieved of their mission tonight and part of the 3d Armored Division was coming in at midnight to relieve them.

At 1426^A, the 16th Infantry reported that the 2d Battalion patrols had covered the area to the 16 grid line and over as far as the 84 grid line and returned, finding nothing except one

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unopened equipment box which contained machine gun barrels and spare parts. The Division told Division Artillery at 1500 A that Company "A", 745th Tank Battalion went direct to the 16th Infantry at 1200A; Company "B" would leave this afternoon; Company "C" left at 1300A and the balance would move out this afternoon.

By 1515A, the 16th Infantry had reported that the following towns were clear of enemy: WEYWERTZ, BUTGENBACH, WEIMES, Road, CHAMPAGNE, BRUYERES, WALK, LONGFAYE, and XHOFFRAIX: one platoon of Belgians was in XHOFFRAIX and 2 sections of Belgians were in LONGFAYE. By 1605A, a patrol from the 16th Infantry reported the town of CHODES was clear; the 120th Infantry was putting troops on the high ground south of CHODES.

Task Force Davisson, consisting of Headquarters, Medical Detachment and Reconnaissance Company, 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled), the 1st Reconnaissance Troop, Company "D" (Light tanks), 745th Tank Battalion, and the Assault Gun Platoon, 745th Tank Battalion, had been ordered to secure the town of WEIMES. Company "B", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion, and one platoon, 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion supported the task force. This was accomplished by 1700A; no personnel was found in either evacuation hospital, but much valuable equipment was found in the hospital.

The 16th Infantry reported at 1800A that the personnel of the 47th Evacuation Field Hospital and Company "D", 99th Medical Battalion (Collecting Company) were evacuated. At 1807A, V Corps notified the Division by radio that the 26th Infantry was detached from the 99th Infantry Division and attached to the 1st US Infantry Division at 181400A. At 1830A, the 26th Infantry reported that Company "L" had contacted elements of the 23rd Infantry and the 9th Infantry who were holding 200 yards north of BERG on our left; the Germans were using the town of BULLINGEN and the regiment was about 600 yards from there. The 26th Infantry also reported that they had caught some paratroopers who were acting as guides and were lost.

m V Corps told the Division at 1840A that the 18th Infantry would continue the mission of mopping up the enemy paratroopers. At 1850A, the Division received Letter of Instructions, Headquarters V Corps, dated 172200A. This order stated that if the situation would permit, the 1st US Infantry Division (less Combat Team 18) would attack in the direction of FAYMONVILLE in coordination with the attack of the 30th Infantry Division which was ordered to move on Corps order to MALMEDY on 18 December.

By 1945A, the 18th Infantry had reported to the Division that they had contacted a group of eight enemy paratroopers and went as far as 8416-8417, finding nothing. The Division told the regiment that V Corps wanted the whole woods swept for enemy paratroopers. At 2310A, the 26th Infantry stated that a patrol went into BULLINGEN and saw about 100 American soldiers who were prisoners. The regiment said that the patrol had "observed about 1000 enemy foot soldiers in the town and the patrol had to beat it."

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Division Artillery reported that the 406th Field Artillery Group, consisting of the 941st Field Artillery Battalion (4.5-inch gun), the 955th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm Howitzer), and one battery of the 272nd Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer), was in direct support of the 1st US Infantry Division. The 32nd Field Artillery Battalion closed in new positions in the vicinity of 7830^R at 171815^A. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery closed in the new position in SOURBRODT at 171915^A. The 7th Field Artillery Battalion closed in new positions in the vicinity of SOURBRODT at 1806pp^A. The 5th Field Artillery Battalion closed in the new area in the vicinity of SOURBRODT at 0800^A. At 1200^A, the 5th Field Artillery Battalion placed harassing fire on the road southeast of BULLINGEN. By 1400^A, the 7th Field Artillery Battalion was registered in the vicinity of 9402 by a 33d Field Artillery Battalion observer.

It was also reported that the 33d Field Artillery Battalion reverted to Division Artillery control at 1358^A. From 171400^A to 181400^A, Division Artillery fired 26 missions; of these, 15 were on interdictions, 2 on vehicles, 5 on tanks and 4 on personnel.

T^Ask Force Davisson reported that they had established six road blocks on the east, south, and west of WEIMES. The 703rd Tank Destroyer (M-36s) was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division as of 171300^A.

(1) The situation at the close of 18 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

b. 19 December 1944

At 0300^A, the 26th Infantry reported that the 2d Battalion was receiving an attack at 932013; the enemy was detrucking at the town of BULLINGEN; our artillery was firing on the attack and the situation was well in hand. At 0510^A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that a Company "K" patrol had contacted the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion and Company "I" had contacted Company "K". The 26th Infantry said at 0700^A, "The 612th TD Battalion that we had attached to us is now attached to the 2d Infantry Div and at the present time is moving. The light tanks that have been attached to us remain (Company "D", 741st Tank Battalion), and are being put in position."

V Corps told the Division at 0800^A, "Want to give you notice to be directed to move the 15th Infantry to the COLTER-HERBERG area to block and to block south of there in the forest area. Directly south from HOFEN are some woods, block that off. Information of a heavy armored column moving on the road and southwest of there. 18th Infantry will stay where they are until further notice; we are keeping them in hand, but they will revert to your control at 0900^A."

X

At 1000A, V Corps said, "The 18th Infantry is being relieved and is going to clear out the parachute area. Will revert to you after they are through." At 1030A, the Division received Letter of Instructions, Headquarters V Corps, dated 182000A. This order stated that the 1st US Infantry Division would defend along the general line (See Overlay); the boundary between the 1st US and 2d Infantry Divisions would be effective immediately; the 1st US Infantry Division would maintain contact the 2d Infantry Division on the left and the 30th Infantry Division on the Right. The order also stated that Combat Command "A", 3d Armored Division, in Corps reserve, would relieve the 18th Infantry of the defense of the town of EUPEN during daylight 19 December and would be prepared to counter-attack to the southeast astride the EUPEN-MONSCHAU road or to the south astride the EUPEN-MALMEDY road in the event of an enemy penetration of the lines.

The order stated that Combat Team 18, upon relief by Combat Command "A", 3d Armored Division, was released from Corps reserve and reverted to the 1st US Infantry Division in place; the movement to the 1st US Infantry Division would be under the control of the Commanding General, 1st US Infantry Division. Combat Team 18 would clean up enemy parachutists in the vicinity of 8318 enroute to the Division area and would be prepared to assemble in the event of an emergency and move rapidly to the Division area; the operation would be completed as quickly as possible.

Letter of Instructions, Headquarters V Corps, dated 190100A, was also received. This order stated that V Corps would readjust its line and hold a defensive position generally along the line MONSCHAU-ELSENBORN-BUTGENBACH-FAYMONVILLE-WEIMES-MALMEDY; also it would close the gap between V and VIII Corps MALMEDY to REICHT. The 1st US Infantry Division would carry out the first part of the mission of V Corps in accordance with the Letter of Instructions, dated 182000A December 1944.

This order further stated that the 1st US Infantry Division would initiate the operation of Combat Team 18 to clear parachutists from the high ground south of EUPEN by not later than 180830A December. Combat Command "A", 3d Armored Division would complete the relief of the 18th Infantry in position in the vicinity of EUPEN by 191000A December.

At 1050A, the 745th Tank Battalion was told that the 16th Infantry would move forward with one battalion and Task Force Davisson was being attached to the 16th Infantry for coordination. By 1100A, the Division had received the following message from Task Force Davisson: "This situation here building up slowly. This TFD not strong enough to stop either strong infantry attack or small tank attack. Contact this morning at 1000A with 5 infantry and two armored cars at 852026. Enemy tanks, type unknown, at hill. Hospital personnel evacuated. Need five 2½ ton to remove equipment. Enemy tank, Mark V or VI, headed into town." At 1106A, Division told the 16th Infantry that a message had been received from Task Force Davisson saying that they might have to withdraw. The 16th Infantry replied, "Tell them to stay there as we are coming with reinforcements."

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The 26th Infantry stated at 1155A, "Things have quieted down considerably. The threat was from the south and east road, came out of BULLINGEN. The other from the south road they believe was the main attack." Shortly after Noon, the 1st Reconnaissance Troop with Task Force Davisson told the Division that the 3d Platoon had one armored car knocked out. At 1345A, the 16th Infantry reported, "Moved up AT guns and M-10s of the 2d Battalion; going into position now. Company 'E' will be on the move in fifteen minutes. The 3d Battalion expects to move out at 1500A. Contact with the 26th Infantry and got a boundary set-up. Our CP is going to move to ROBERTVILLE."

Operations Instructions Number 31, Headquarters 1st US Infantry Division, dated 191400A, was issued to all units at 1406A. This order stated that the 1st US Infantry Division would occupy and defend a defensive position along the high ground from WEIMES due east to the right flank of the 2d Infantry Division. (See Appendix B - Tactical Orders, December 1944).

At 1448A, the 16th Infantry reported that they had contacted the 120th Infantry and the 26th Infantry and were tied in. At 1520A, the 1st Reconnaissance Troop said that the 3d Platoon reported that the enemy was deployed about 200 to 300 yards from their positions and the platoon planned to engage them with mortars and cannon. At 1725A, the 16th Infantry reported, "Traffic conditions are being clogged up with fully loaded vehicles. The 3d Battalion got in completely. 'E' Company is having a little fight on the west edge of the town. The 3d Battalion is firing an artillery mission on enemy infantry. 'G' Company is south of the town; 'H' Company is at 885035; 'I' Company is at 875035; 'K' company is at 864035; 'E' Company is at 851026 and 'G' Company is at 843030. The 1st Battalion moves the first thing in the morning."

At 1730A, the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) reported that they had captured several reels of undeveloped film and three American jeeps by 182000A. At 2010A, the 1st Reconnaissance Troop told the Division, "Plans for tonight are the same as last night as to patrols and outposts with an additional outpost at 838044 which is a contact point with the 120th Infantry. The 3rd Platoon is in position and is contacting friendly troops." At 2035A, the Division told the 16th Infantry that Company "B", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion would be detached from the combat team tomorrow morning.

The 18th Infantry reported at 2135A, "The 2d Battalion is on their objective and the 1st Battalion is on their objective; the 3d Battalion has two companies on their objective. Had everybody rush before dark. 'K' Company jumped into paratroopers dug in; that force runs in a line roughly from 821195 over to and including 830200. Have 'K' company containing them tonight. Have to maintain contact during the night. Will plan to move at 1000A tomorrow."

V Corps told the Division at 2255A, "One Company of the 703rd is to move in the morning; that is confirmed. Alert the one company that is not committed to take a rcn platoon and their

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ammo truck with them. Will let you know the time." At 2300A, the Division told the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion to alert Company "B" to move tomorrow morning with the 82nd Airborne Division. The 26th Infantry told the Division that Company "B" was tied in physically along the railroad and by sound-power telephone with the 16th Infantry.

At 2330A, the 16th Infantry reported, "The situation from FAYMONVILLE. About 50 Infantry up there; rushed in the house at BELLAIRE in groups of 8 to 10. 'I' Company positions are back; 'I' Company right flank is the house at BELLAIRE, then to 879039. Been killing a lot of enemy up there. They moved in since we came up. We have people in the house and 'F' and 'K' Companies are tied in at the junction at 858037. 'K' is just north of the road over to the next junction at 867. 'I' Company is in the coordinate 879. 'F' Company right flank is 852033, have road blocks there. 'E' Company on flank of stream at 850026 and comes across the main road out, right flank at 849027. Have contact with 'C' Company, 12th Infantry and have joint outposts."

The 18th Infantry reported at 2340A that Company "L" was in position astride the EUPEN-MALMEDY road on approximately the 18 grid. Division Artillery reported that the 406 Field Artillery Group was relieved from a direct support mission to the 1st US Infantry Division and the 955th Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the Division; Battery "B", 200th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm gun) was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division Artillery.

It was also reported that at 0430A this morning, one battalion of the 2d Infantry Battalions in a TOT shoot on HONSFELD which was reported as an enemy assembly area. At daybreak, plans were made for a series of similar shoots which were indicated as probable targets from prisoner of war and observer reports. Included among these were the towns of MODERSCHIED, HONSFELD, and BULLINGEN, and the roads connecting these, upon which traffic was moving toward the west. The 32nd Field Artillery Battalion began to move to the Division sector at 1515A. From 181400A to 191600A, Division Artillery and supporting units fired 102 missions; of these, 16 were on enemy personnel, 10 on tanks, 13 on vehicles, 20 interdictions, 5 registrations, 34 harassing, and 4 miscellaneous.

(1) The situation at the close of 19 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

a. 20 December 1944

At 0030A, V corps told the Division that Company "B", 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion would move on the road at 0800A to go to the 82nd Airborne Division; they would meet elements of the 82d Airborne Division at WEBERMONT. The Division gave

this information to the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion. The Division Headquarters told Division Artillery at 0335A that the 26th Infantry reported that they were getting tanks and infantry and would like some artillery on it; it was getting worse on the BULLINGEN road and west of the 93 grid line.

Division Artillery reported that they had been firing artillery for the 26th Infantry on tanks and infantry, but if they needed more, the artillery would give it to them.

At 0400A, the 26th Infantry reported, "Attack on us died down a bit, but are now receiving enemy artillery, pretty heavy." By 0603A, the 26th Infantry had told the Division that Company "F" reported tanks were coming at them again on both sides of the road; the regiment had requested considerable artillery. Division Artillery said that the 33d Field Artillery Battalion was firing there and at 930007; the 2d Infantry Division Artillery was firing harassing fires at the 952000 area. At 0620A, the 26th Infantry stated that they were committing a platoon of Company "G" and there was a slight break through on Companies "E" and "F" at approximately 945018, west of the road. The 16th Infantry reported at 0810A that they had contact with the 120th Infantry; the 2d Battalion was running 2-hour patrols during the night.

At 0822A, the Division told V Corps that Company "B", 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion left for the 82nd Airborne Division at 0800A. The 16th Infantry said at 0857A, "Getting the 3d Battalion consolidated. Quite a lot of artillery last night to good effect. Company 'K' is in a fire fight now; it's well in hand. By night, expect to be in top notch shape. The 1st Battalion extends over to BRUYERES. Moving Company 'C' down to take Company 'K's' position. Company 'B' will take care of the right flank."

By 0805A, the 26th Infantry had reported that they had moved Company "C" out and the company was now to be committed with the 2d Battalion, going in around Company "F". The regiment also stated that they had to commit the reserve platoon and they would commit some of Company "C". At 1003A, the 18th Infantry reported, "Got those paratroopers pretty well bottled up. Recaptured 23 Americans from other units. Will be cleaned out in about another hour, Company 'K' from the north, Company 'L' from the southwest and have a blocking position of the 3d Battalion on the east so they can't get out. Estimated strength of the paratroopers is about 75. Starting movement of the 2d Battalion to the new area at 1000A. Be infiltrating special units from 1000A on."

At 1015A, Division Artillery told Division Headquarters that the 134th Anti-aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

was attached to the Division and there was a liaison officer from the battalion at the Division Artillery Headquarters. The 26th Infantry stated at 1045A, "I have been hit all night long. This last company hit way up in the Company 'B' area. I have everything committed.

Shortly after Noon, the 26th Infantry reported that their Company "C" was attached to the 2d Battalion; the situation with Company "B" had quieted down; the regiment had used 3-inch gun fire directly on the enemy. The 18th Infantry reported that the woods were swept and they were on the two objectives. The Division gave this information to V Corps. The 1st Reconnaissance Troop reported that at 190948A a dismounted patrol from the 634th Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance Company had moved through their 3d Platoon positions in the vicinity of WEIMES and was pinned down by machine gun fire; two light tanks from the 745th Tank Battalion moved through the Reconnaissance Platoon position to reduce the enemy machine gun nest. The light tanks returned at about 191030A with a Mark V on their heels. The 3d Platoon engaged the enemy tank; one M-8 was knocked out, but four bazooka hits were made and the tank withdrew, apparently with a disabled turret.

At 1235A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that their 3d Battalion had everything under control and they were not worried about the report that the enemy was working up the railroad; Company "C" was staying where they were and Company "A" was taking Company "K's" place. According to the 18th Infantry at 1310A, in the sweep of the woods this morning they had killed three and wounded five enemy; V Corps was given this information. At 1335A, the 18th Infantry was told that the battalion in this area was being attached to the 26th Infantry, as they anticipated an attack. The 26th Infantry was told, "The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry is being attached to you to take over the sector where Companies 'A' and 'B' are."

The Division told the 18th Infantry at 1345A, "You people are released to us, but you will have to keep a small force ready to move if something comes up - a force no bigger than a company." At mid-afternoon, the 26th Infantry told the Division that they had patrol contact with the 38th Infantry at 949940. At 1635A, the Division told V Corps that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 18th Infantry were in and the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry was on the way. By 1718A, the 16th Infantry had reported that an enemy attack which had started at approximately 1625A was stopped. The regiment said, "If a tank comes out, we can hit it with the 57s and the anti-tank guns we have up there. We contacted the 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry around CHIVREMONT: made physical contact, about 400 yards."

At 1750^A, the Division said to the 2d Infantry Division, "Save your right flank at 931047 and it makes a big

gap. Suggest you work something forward and keep it out there. The 26th Infantry reported they have patrols to 944042 and no enemy was there. Make stream junction a contact point for the 26th and your patrols; it's right on the boundary." The 2d Infantry Division agreed to this arrangement.

The 2d Infantry Division said to the Division at 1903A that they had a strong patrol out tonight and tomorrow would have a strong platoon to Hill 945. The Division gave this information to the 26th Infantry. At 1915A, the 18th Infantry reported, "We closed as of 1800A. We are now in our area, the 1st Battalion at 861095, the 3d Battalion at OVIFAT." The 18th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, was in Division reserve. At 2042A, the Division asked the three infantry regiments if they had the personnel to fire 4.2 inch mortars, should they come to the Division. The 26th Infantry stated that they had enough men to fire 12 such mortars; the 18th Infantry stated they had the personnel to man 12 mortars and the 16th Infantry stated that they could use 6 of these mortars.

At 2100A, the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) was told that the Division was pulling Task Force Davisson out of WEIMES tomorrow morning. The tank destroyer battalion was told that the Division wanted the task force to assemble north of WEYWERTZ on the north side of the stream. By 2249A, the 18th Infantry had reported that the 3d Battalion had sent a patrol to guard the dam at 845073, as ordered.

At 2305A, the Division told the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments, "Got word from Corps that seems to be hot. That this force hitting MONSCHAU is slipping south and has the mission of eliminating this shoulder, driving north." The platoon of the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry was reported in position at the dam at 845073.

Division Artillery reported that at 0135A this morning, the 33d Field Artillery Battalion reported an attack by enemy infantry supported by tanks was coming in on the 26th Infantry from the vicinity of 936007. By 0200A, it was reported that two tanks and some machine guns had been knocked out by our artillery and bazooka fire. The 5th, 33d, and 955th Field Artillery Battalions, and one battery of the 414th Anti-aircraft Battalion had been placed on this attack with excellent results. At the request of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion, additional fire from the 5th Field Artillery Battalion was placed on enemy infantry on the road in the vicinity of 930007 at 0342A. The 2d Infantry Division Artillery put some heavy fire on the town of BULLINGEN at 0500A. The attack flared up again shortly after 0600A in the same area. The 5th, 33d, and 955th Field Artillery Battalions gave the enemy another thorough going over, while the 2d Infantry Division Artillery placed over 300 rounds in the town between 0600 and 0700A. The

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33d Field Artillery Battalion reported that the attack had been broken up; 7 tanks had been seen burning, 2 more were probably destroyed, and some of the tanks which had penetrated our lines were being taken care of by our infantry.

Division Artillery also reported that at 1515A today, the 5th and 32nd Field Artillery Battalions began a one-hour harassing program with battery volleys on the towns of LIGNEUVILLE, (805984) and EIBERTINGEN (878971). From 191600A to 201600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 169 missions. Of these, 36 were on personnel, 6 on enemy guns, 3 on command posts and observation posts, 25 on interdictions, 21 on tanks, 7 on vehicles, 6 on machine guns and mortars, 39 harassing, 5 registrations, and 1 on a counter-attack. Division Artillery, and attached and supporting units, in effective support of the Division broke up one night attack, destroyed 7 enemy tanks, probably destroyed others, and continued its preparations for artillery support and the defense of the Division sector. The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company "B" and one Reconnaissance Platoon, was attached to Division Artillery.

(1) The situation at the close of 20 December is shown in Appendix E-Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

d. 21 December 1944.

At 0500A, Division Artillery told Division Headquarters, "The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry has got a terrific artillery barrage which knocked out all communications. Radio message received at 0420A asked for artillery fire on all defensive points. By 0615A, the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry had reported by radio that everything was under control." The 26th Infantry stated at 0810A that an enemy attack against the 2d Battalion was continuing.

By 0950A, the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry was reported as receiving a heavy enemy attack with some penetration by several enemy tanks, but no infantry. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was still attached to Combat Team 26 and Company "E", 18th Infantry was said to be moving to a position in the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry sector. It was reported that Task Force Davisson left the town of WEIMES at approximately 1000A enroute to the vicinity of WEYWERTZ; the Task Force was released from attachment to Combat Team 16. By 1140A, the 26th Infantry had told the Division that the penetration on Company "G" was under control and the situation was being restored; Company "E" 18th Infantry was being moved into the vicinity of Company "G", 26th Infantry.

By noon, the 26th Infantry had reported that the enemy tanks were pulling back and the situation was improved. At 1214A, Division Artillery told Division Headquarters, "Over in the 26th sector, enemy tanks have gone into the woods at 915015; we are hitting the woods with 3 Battalions." By 1330A, Company "G"

18th Infantry was said to have relieved Company "B", 26th Infantry and the latter was moving to Hill 598, tying in with Company "K" 26th Infantry. The 26th Infantry said that they were getting tanks and infantry around the right again. The enemy tanks and infantry was again reported as attacking the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry. The Assistant chief of Staff, G2, told the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, that the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 12th SS Division was reported as attacking the 26th Infantry.

At 1423^A, the 26th Infantry reported, "On this attack of ours, it is pretty heavy and pretty well scattered one platoon of ours. We lost 6 bazookas, 2 57mms, 6 BARs, and 2-30 Cal machine guns. 'A' Company is still in the line; 'B' Company in reserve position and next to be committed. Got 5 companies in that little sector now. Also have 3-inch towed guns there, about 4 of them. Three enemy tanks are in front of the 2d Battalion command post now." At 1430^A, the Division asked V Corps for 2 Companies of the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion saying, "We have plenty of tanks to cope with. Need more anti-tank guns."

The 16th Infantry told Division Headquarters at 1435^A that they were moving Company "B" to take over the Company "F" position; Company "F" was released to the 2d Battalion to close a few gaps. At 1450^A, the 26th Infantry reported that they had lost 3 Tank Destroyers (M-10) and 2 tanks.

The 26th Infantry told the Division at 1517^A, "Out of 5 tanks, knocked out 3. 90-mm knocked out one; another tank is still roaming around. 'B' Company is going to move to Hill 598. 'G' Company on our right now. Positions now, going from right, 'G', 'E', 'F', west to east, then 'C' Company attached. One platoon of 'G' Company was wiped out completely. 'E' Company will probably go to 'G' Company area of the 18th. 'E' Company of 18th relieving 'G' Company; supplement it, and 'B' Company will occupy Hill 598. If they can't hold it, 'I' Company will drop between 'B' and 'L' and take position; the 2d Battalion will fade back through them. Tanks and infantry hit 'G' Company; whole regiment has been in there. The enemy is taking casualties too, same as we are, and losing a lot of men. We mauled two battalions that we know of. Would like to get 3-inch guns tonight if possible. The total number of tanks we knocked out was probably 8. Men were told that they had to hold the line."

At 1700^A, the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry was ordered to employ one company to secure the dam at 845072 and the road net to the south. By 1840^A, Company "I", 18th Infantry was reported in position near the dam. The 18th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, was still in Division reserve. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was said to have placed 2000 mines and 1500 yards of triple concertina wire to improve its position. The 26th Infantry was told at 1745^A that there was a company of 4.2 inch mortars in po-

sition 1000 yards northeast of regimental command post and this company could support the 26th Infantry from that position; the Company was available for supporting fires, but was not attached to the Division. This chemical Mortar Company had been loaned to the Division by the 2d Infantry Division for this supporting mission. The 26th Infantry stated that a hasty mine field consisting of 1050 mines had been laid in front of Companies "E" and "F".

Division Artillery reported that at 0420A this morning, the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) fired illuminating shells through the 32d Field Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center at the request of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion; the area to be illuminated was at 940012, west of BULLINGEN. At 0850A, the 2d Infantry Division Artillery began interdicting the area west of BULLINGEN, at our request, in support of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion who had reported enemy activity in the vicinity of 925015. The 33d and 955th Field Artillery Battalions were already firing in that area.

Since it appeared that a counter-attack was forming, the 5th, 7th, and 32d Field Artillery Battalions were also given missions to reinforce the fires of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion. Not long afterward, 4 battalions of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery were brought in to supplement this fire. At 0934A, the 33d Field Artillery Battalion reported enemy tanks and infantry were attempting a break through at 925018. Fire was shifted to this point, but considerable fire was also brought to bear upon the entire regimental front. At 1000A, 10 medium guns of the 99th Infantry Division Artillery were placed at our disposal.

Division Artillery also stated that by 1100A 5 enemy tanks were burning in front of the 26th Infantry positions. Battery "B", 200th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery "C", 134th Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion were given harassing fire missions during the afternoon covering the road net work and the towns deep in front of the Division sector. When the urgency of the situation had subsided, at about 1300A, all battalions were given harassing and interdiction missions in the general area from which the enemy offensive had been launched. Air observation was limited to 500 yards in the morning and was practically nil in the afternoon.

It was also reported that from 201600A to 211600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 291 missions with the 5th Field Artillery Battalion firing 40 missions, the 7th firing 59, the 32d firing 73, the 33d firing 51, the 955th firing 44, Battery "B" of the 200th firing 8, the 134th Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion firing 10, and the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) firing 6 missions. Of the total missions fired, 3 were on enemy guns, 44 on enemy personnel, 18 on vehicles, 48 on tanks, 17 on counter-attacks, 56 interdictions, 2 on observation posts and command posts, 85 harassing, 6 illuminating, and 14 miscellaneous.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that one squad of Company "A" removed demolition charges from the bridge at K-856067; one squad was on guard at the bridge to replace the de-

molitions if necessary. One platoon of Company "C" laid a hasty mine field in the vicinity of 928017 to 939021; the field was to be extended tonight. Reconnaissance was made of the bridge at K-912052 and the road over the dam at K-918049 and plans were made to destroy them if necessary. One platoon of Company "B" strengthened the bridge at 834090, making it a Class 12 from a Class 3.

According to the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) the 1st Platoon, Company "A" fired at about 30 enemy in a house from its position at 895037; those not killed were taken prisoner by the infantry. The 2d Platoon, Company "A" knocked out two tanks of unknown type from their positions at 926023.

(1) The situation at the close of 21 December is shown in Appendix E-Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive

3. 22 December 1944.

At 0023A, the 16th Infantry reported, "'K' Company patrol went to 870003 and found enemy activity at the next high ground. Found several dead on the way to that point. At 2355^A, four enemy came up on the railroad track and were readily disposed of - four dead Jerries. An 'L' Company patrol to the river in front of their position was accomplished, but no enemy found. This patrol saw a light in the woods south of the stream and when they returned a mortar concentration was placed on the position. An 'L' Company patrol went to 888033 and observed sentries in front of the house where we had a skirmish during the day. They will be taken care of."

At 0712A, the 26th Infantry reported, "Enemy is milling around 'K' Company; tanks and infantry." The division gave this information to V Corps. Division Artillery told Division Headquarters at 0730^A that they had fired on the tanks and infantry at 904012.

At 0830^A, Division Artillery told Division Headquarters, "Things are quiet now. There was light pressure on the 2d Battalion, 26th starting about 0530^A. The 33d FA fired and the pressure faded. About one hour later, tanks and infantry were heard on the roads - that died off. Then at 0730^A, some more pressure between the two points, from the 2d Battalion, 920015 to 915023. We fired on that. Got targets in the open; then that died down. Only doing harassing fire right now. We have been firing observed fire for some time." At 0850^A, the Division told the 2d Infantry Division that the 26th Infantry did not adjust their position as planned. This plan was to withdraw forward elements to the high ground slightly in rear of the present forward positions to have better forward observation.

The 26th Infantry reported at 0900^A, "Just got infiltration and fighting men around CP. As far as I know, are fighting in the town." Task Force Davisson was alerted at 0910^A to move as

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fast as possible to BUTGENBACH when ordered to move. The task force was told enemy was in the town where the 26th Infantry was and the task force would move in if the regiment could not handle the situation. At 0940A, the 26th Infantry told the Division, "Left platoon of 'K' Company in place intact. We are doing some firing between the following points: 910035 and 915035, by the creek. Enemy down there - got through our lines. There are about four to six tanks and we can see two tanks bogged down. We are readjusting with 90-mm; others under artillery fire. Some enemy around 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry mortar positions at 909039 and some enemy in buildings around there. We are bringing 'B' Company back into the town area to use in case we have to clean it out."

The Division told the 26th Infantry, "Gave the 18th Infantry a sector running through your 'A' Company. Giving you a reserve and the 18th Infantry that sector. Germans want this road, as it runs through WEIMES to MALMEDY, and if we pull back, we will be giving it to them. Have to hold. Strengthen your right and keep a reserve on the high ground." V Corps was given the information about the tank and infantry penetration on "A" and "K" Companies, 26th Infantry.

At 1113A, Task Force Davisson was told that their mission was to cover the area at GVIFAT, protect to the southwest, maintain contact with the 120th Infantry, prevent enemy infiltration from that flank, and cover the dam. The 18th Infantry stated at 1120A that the 3d Battalion would be in Division reserve. Shortly after noon, the 26th Infantry was told, "Present plan. To move the 1st Battalion to WEYWERTZ with all possible speed, under 18th Infantry control. Will attack southeast; restore positions held by Companies 'A' and 'C' and tie in with you. CG wants the force you have, the 3d Battalion, to get back on the other switch positions as quickly as possible. The 18th Infantry will tie in with you on the thing. Holding up on the other plan until the situation gets restored."

The Division told V Corps, "26th PGR of the 12th SS Division closed right in on us. Between Companies 'A' and 'K', 26th Infantry is a gap of about 800 yards. Enemy have gotten through to BUTGENBACH. Company 'B', 26th Infantry is moving now from BUTGENBACH down to Company 'A', 26th Infantry and is attacking due east to close that gap. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry is moving down to WEYWERTZ and will attack southeast to push that back and recapture the positions Companies 'A' and 'K' held. Attack startee about 0830 to 0900. Got tanks through. Two tanks knocked out."

At 1225A, the 18th Infantry was told, "As far as the other plan is concerned, it won't hurt us to move the 2d Battalion. If something happens and if the situation doesn't clarify with Company 'B', you can use the Battalion. Let the 1st Battalion go down prepared to attack and if the situation doesn't clarify, go ahead

and attack. We want to make sure this is under your control. "The fire in the town had died down and we know the town hasn't been taken."

At 1245A, the Division told the 2d Infantry Division that there was a gap of 800 yards between Companies "A" and "K", 26th Infantry. Task Force Davisson was told at 1247A to move out on the new mission as soon as the first company of the 18th Infantry arrived in WEYWERTZ. At 1301A, the 26th Infantry told the Division, "Situation now looks all right. It is quiet down there. These people are definitely in there and holding the ground they have. With Company 'B' going down, I think everything could be cleared up all right. Counted 19 tanks KO'd in front of the 2d Battalion. KO'd 2 more this morning."

By 1320A, the Division liaison officer to the 2d Infantry Division had reported that Company "G", 38th Infantry was moving to the north edge of the lake, as soon as they get organized, to have a field of fire in the southwest direction covering the north end of BUTGENBACH. The 18th Infantry told the Division, "CO's suggestion is that we have our 1st Battalion move into positions in rear of Companies 'A' and 'K', 26th Infantry with the idea of eventually moving up and taking them over and releasing the battalion of the 26th Infantry, to include that road net south of the town and where the 2d Battalion is now. That would release the 26th Infantry and would put fresh troops in that threatened area."

At 1400A, the Division told the 26th Infantry that the 18th Infantry was going to put the battalion in the place where the 26th Infantry was having trouble and the Division wanted a boundary between the 26th Infantry and the 18th Infantry; the road down to BUTGENBACH, inclusive to the 26th Infantry, was suggested. The 26th Infantry replied, "That boundary will be all right. The enemy just started up this area with a mixed column. Our artillery is doing a job on them now. Tanks, infantry, artillery, and AA are in the column. We still have this gap. Have three strong points which seal the gap so there is no place they can pull through. Company 'B' is counter-attacking now. If Company 'B' can restore the ground, they will be relieved. If not, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry will counter-attack."

Operations Instructions Number 32, dated 221500A, was issued to all units at 1500A. This order stated that the 18th Infantry would occupy and defend the designated sector, relieving elements of the 26th Infantry now in that sector. Command of this sector was to pass to the 18th Infantry on mutual agreement between the Commanding Officer, 26th Infantry, and the Commanding Officer, 18th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry was to remain in present positions as Division reserve. The order further stated that the 26th Infantry would organize a new zone of defense and be prepared to

occupy a defensive position on the Main Line of Resistance on orders of Division Headquarters; the 26th Infantry would release Company "E", 18th Infantry to the 18th Infantry as soon as practicable. (See Appendix B - Tactical Orders, December 1944).

The 26th Infantry reported at 1615A, "Our 'B' Company has not made much progress - they don't hold either of the RJs. Will tie in with Company 'A' wherever they are at dark. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry cannot attack today. Will take up a position from that area over to the main road to the east, roughly along the creek, tying in at the CRs at the main road." Task Force Davisson was reported at 1700A as having closed in at 1600^A in the vicinity of WALK at 839063.

The 18th Infantry told Division Headquarters at 1825A, "B' Company is now at 915034, center of goose-egg. 'C' Company should be in at 098033 and 'A' Company is in reserve on the south side of the town at 912039. If the Germans do not attack in the morning, we will, and we will attempt to get the best ground and then will be able to relieve Companies 'A', 'B', and 'K'". The 26th Infantry told the Division at 1918^A that the 18th Infantry had assumed responsibility for the sector with "A" and "B" Companies, 26th Infantry attached.

At 2130^A, the 18th Infantry reported, "All three companies are in. 'I' Company, 26th Infantry has reassembled and pulled back a little. 'B' Company is up there too. The 2d Battalion will have four rows of mines around them. Observed a couple of flares due south of 'E' Company. We are sending a patrol to the road junction and if they get there, am going to send troops out there. Otherwise, will go in the morning." The 18th Infantry told Division Headquarters at 2203A, "Patrol went to 899016 and made no contact with the enemy. Another patrol is going out to 891023. The first patrol found quite a few American and enemy dead, but they were unable to identify them. The second patrol will try to identify them."

At 2305A, Division Artillery stated that at 2230A the 26th Infantry requested some Star Shells in BULLINGEN. The North edge of the town was well illuminated and six tanks were observed. Artillery fired within 200 yards of that point started a fire. The artillery also stated that the action in front of the 26th Infantry at 946017 had decreased. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, less Company "E", reverted to the 18th Infantry; Company "E", 18th Infantry was still in the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry sector. At the close of the day, the enemy penetration in the 26th Infantry sector was being held to 200 yards; plans were made to reduce this penetration tomorrow morning.

Division Artillery reported that at 0600A the 33d and 55th Field Artillery Battalions were firing on enemy tanks at 922018 and 919013. At 0730A, more tanks were fired upon in the

vicinity of 904012 and 907006. Enemy activity, including tanks, was reported by the 33d Field Artillery Battalion at 0930A in the vicinity of 910031, 930007, 908028 and 947017. These points, south of BUTGENBACH and west of BULLINGEN, were all brought under fire by all battalions at once. Infiltration of enemy infantry at 913034 was fired on at 0950A. Numerous targets of infantry, tanks, and other vehicles were fired on during the entire day in this manner. All roads and draws south of BUTGENBACH were under almost constant fire, with the result that some 20 odd tanks were reported to have been destroyed in the 26th Infantry sector. The 32d and 7th Field Artillery Battalions fired on tanks and infantry in their respective zones of action as well as in front of the 26th Infantry. By 1200^A, it was definitely established that Companies "A" and "K", of enemy infantry were dug in at two points on a 1000 yard front 600 yards south of BUTGENBACH.

It was further stated by the artillery that at 1305A the 32d and 955th Field Artillery Battalions fired on a troop assembly area in the vicinity of 095025, reported by a prisoner, just as an observer from the 32d Field Artillery Battalion called for fire on the identical point, where he had seen enemy activity. The 5th, 7th, and Battery "B", 200th Field Artillery Battalions joined in a TOT on SCHOPPEN at 1340^A. 20 minutes later, the 955th Field Artillery Battalion fired on vehicles parked in the same area. The 5th Field Artillery Battalion was adjusted on 11 tanks by the air observation post in the vicinity of 904017 at 1520^A. By 1530A, the 2d Infantry Division, using four battalions of artillery, had completed three TOTs on BULLINGEN. BULLINGEN was hit again at 1715^A by the 955th Field Artillery Battalion, firing 2-battalion volleys on each of the four points in the town.

It was reported that from 211600A to 221600^A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 334 missions with the 5th Field Artillery Battalion firing 58 missions, the 7th firing 56, the 32d firing 62, the 33d firing 73, the 955th firing 51, Battery "B" of the 200th firing 26, the 134th Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion firing 5, and the 634th Tank Destroyer (Self-propelled) firing 3 missions. Of the total missions fired, 77 were on tanks, 108 were on interdictions, 48 on infantry, 13 on vehicles, 4 on command posts and observations posts, 2 on enemy guns, 73 were harassing, and 19 were miscellaneous.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that one squad of Company "A" was guarding the bridge at K-856067, prepared to place demolitions if necessary. Company "A" laid a hasty mine field (1315 mines) in the vicinity of K-862067 to K-872038; this mine field was to be extended. Company "B" laid a hasty mine field (1760 mines) in the vicinity of K-892037 to K-895036 to K-898029; the field was to be extended. Company "C" laid hasty mine fields (2544) mines, including 1050 mines laid on 21 December) in the

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vicinity of K-922022 to K-934018 and K0937022 to K0938017; these mine fields were also to be extended. The engineer battalion completed reconnaissance of bridges in the Division sector to determine those to be destroyed as a delaying action if a withdrawal were ordered.

The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) stated that in addition to two enemy tanks previously reported as being destroyed, the 2d Platoon, Company "A" destroyed four tanks and possibly two more during 21 December; the 3d platoon destroyed one tank during 22 December; the 2d Platoon, Company "C" knocked out one Mark V tank expending five rounds of 3-inch APC.

(1) The situation at the close of 22 December is shown in Appendix E-Daily Situation overlays, 18-21 December 1944, Inclusive.

e. 23 December 1944.

At 0037^A, the 18th Infantry reported, "A Company 'B' patrol went to 908028 where they spotted an enemy tank knocked out, but the motor was running. round of bazooka fire stopped the motor." At 0210^A, the 18th Infantry said, "In 45 minutes, one platoon of Company 'B' is to leave to occupy and hold positions at 098029-917028." By 0230^A, the 16th Infantry had reported, "Tanks reported at 856011-863012, moving across country; the 2d Battalion placed artillery fire on them. The 3d Battalion reported tanks at 880029-885031; also had artillery placed on them." The 26th Infantry reported that an enemy vehicle had hit one of the mine fields in front of the 1st Battalion.

At 0410^A, V Corps told the Division that First Army instructions were that troops in advance of Division rear boundaries would carry gas mask at all times. By 0825^A, the 16th Infantry had reported, "We laid mines in front of our battalions, the 1st Battalion 1200 mines, 2d Battalion 900 mines, and the 3d Battalion 615 mines." At 0935^A, the Division told the 2d Infantry Division, "The situation between Companies "A" and "K", 26th Infantry has been restored and the hill behind them is occupied by our troops." The entire 200th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division as of 0830A.

At 1000^A, the following message was sent to all units; "All troops in advance of Division rear boundaries will carry gas mask at all times." At 1015^A, the Division told all units that the message concerning the wearing of gas masks had been repeated as urgent.

The Division told V Corps at 0945^A that the position between Companies "A" and "k", 26th Infantry was restored. At 1135^A, the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments was told, "WE finally

got air. They are in the air now. Not targets; going to shoot at them; column from FAYMONVILLE to SCHOPPEN and also one to BULLINGEN. Pass the word to your forward troops, as we want to know the results of the mission."

At 1157A, the Division received the Barrier Plan, dated 22 December, from V Corps. One copy of this plan was given to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, one to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and one to the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion for execution in the Division sector. The Corps Commander visited the Division command post at 1303A.

The 18th Infantry stated at 1338^A, "The 3d Battalion has closed in its assembly area as of this time in the vicinity of our CP." The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion was told at 1342A, "You are going back to your parent unit, all except one company. We will keep Company 'C'. Will be relieved by another unit, the 644th TD (SP). Relief is to be gun by gun. One company is coming in presently and will relieve your 'A' Company. Relief is to be initiated as soon as possible. Your instructions will come in from V Corps."

The 16th Infantry was told at 1445A that the Division was losing the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion, except for Company "C", including the Headquarters; a company of M-10s was coming in now to relieve Company "A" gun by gun; the four guns were to be mobile to assist the 18th Infantry in the vicinity of WEYWERTZ; there were to be no changes in gun positions. The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) was given the information concerning the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion. V Corps said at 1455^A that there was an error in the teletype this morning concerning the gas mask; the message was to state that the gas mask would be ready or available for issue.

At 1538A, the Division told V Corps, "Mediums are bombing BUTGENBACH. We have troops in there." The 33d Field Artillery Battalion was told to have a sub see what damage was done on BUTGENBACH and report the details to Division Headquarters. The 16th Infantry told the Division that the 2d Battalion reported enemy movement north of ONDENVAL coming toward their positions; an estimated strength of 200 enemy infantry and tracked vehicles. At 1557A, the 33d Field Artillery Battalion told Division Headquarters that the point of the medium bombing was 916046.

At 1600A, the Division was told by the 1st Reconnaissance Troop that at 221515A the troop moved to the dam at 845073 between WALK and OVIFAT and relieved Company "I", 18th Infantry which was guarding the dam. At 1745^A, V Corps notified the Division that the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion would be in Corps reserve and would stay where they were; the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion would remain unchanged.

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The 26th Infantry told Division Headquarters at 1750A that eight bombs were dropped, four exploded and four duds. The 18th Infantry stated at 1930A that anti-aircraft had identified the planes as A-20. It was reported at 2015A that Company "B", 26th Infantry had replaced Company "D", 18th Infantry and could contact the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry; Company "E" was in the center, Company "F" was on the left flank, and Company "G" was in battalion reserve; Company "K" was between Companies "I" and "L".

The 16th Infantry told the Division at 2135A that a patrol from Company "E" had reached STEINBACH and to the road south where the road goes under the railroad. At 2245A, the 18th Infantry reported that a patrol from Company "F" went from 904026 west along the bank of the stream to the road crossing and ran into a road block just north of the woods; they were fired upon and went toward SCHOPPEN meeting heavier and heavier fire until they reached 899016 where they turned back. They reported the road block and surrounding area was heavily booby-trapped. The 18th Infantry was told to have the 3d Battalion reconnoiter tomorrow for routes by which to support the 16th Infantry.

Division Artillery reported that they had put shoots on a number of places during last night and today as called for by the infantry and air observation. These included the towns of MODERSCHIED, SCHOPPEN, FAYMONVILLE, STEINBACH, and BULLINGEN; excellent results were observed particularly in the town of BULLINGEN.

At 1105A, fire was placed on about 300 enemy infantry and some tanks going east at 885008; this fire continued for twenty minutes with excellent results. The 32d air observation post plane was shot down by enemy aircraft at 1242A. The Division Artillery air observation post at 1346A reported allied planes with orange markings on the wing and rudder in the Division area. A large enemy column moving east was heavily interdicted at 960017 by the 5th Field Artillery Battalion.

It was also reported that from 221600A to 231600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 45 missions on tanks, 47 interdiction, 65 on infantry, 47 on vehicles, 12 counter-battery, 56 harassing, 23 marking missions for air targets, 3 illumination, and 14 miscellaneous missions. Three fighter-bomber squadrons worked with the Division on close support missions today. One squadron at 1155 A was released because the target was obscured. At 1530A, a squadron bombed and strafed vehicles in MODERSCHIED.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that Company "A" laid a hasty mine field of 628 mines from 885035 to 890034, and another of 999 mines from 837018 to 843016; one squad was prepared to place demolitions on the bridge at K-856067. Company "B"

extended a hasty mine field from 898029 to 902031, laying 367 mines. Company "C" maintained roads in the Combat Team 26 sector and cut logs for fortifications. The engineer battalion made an examination of the dam spillway at K-846073.

(1) The situation at the close of 23 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

f. 24 December 1944.

At 0045^A, the 16th Infantry reported, "Two enemy tanks and about 15 infantry came up to the RJ at 839012. As the enemy approached that point, we placed artillery, mortar and small arms fire on them. The enemy returned the fire and withdrew a little, but are still around." At 0310^A, the 18th Infantry reported that a patrol from Company "C" had gone south to the edge of the woods and had found an abandoned friendly gun position, but no personnel. The 16th Infantry told Division Headquarters at 0325^A that an enemy half-track ran into the mine field in the Company "E" sector.

The 18th Infantry reported at 0410^A that Company "G" ran a patrol to SCHOPPEN; the patrol had moved 500 yards from the company outpost at 893028 and drew machine gun and self-propelled fire. At 0756^A, Task Force Davisson was authorized to conduct only night patrols. At 0910^A, the Division told the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments that the Division had no control over the planes today and the regiments should be prepared to use their identification panels. At 1048^A, the Division received a report after action from Task Force Davisson, dated 23 December. At 1115^A, Division Artillery stated that they were interdicting the roads and enemy vehicles were well dispersed.

At 1220^A, the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments were told, "Have one company of the 86th Chemical Battalion attached to us. You will get one group and the 18th Infantry one, (Company "A"). These are 4.2s". The 16th Infantry was told at 1240^A, "Turning over two tubes of 4.2s which are going to be made available to you as soon as they come in. Other eight guns go in the vicinity of WEY-WERTZ and liaison parties will be there with the 18th and 16th Infantries. corporal squad leader will be with each of the guns."

At 1430^A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that Fortresses were dropping markers and bombs while in our front lines. The Division gave this information to V Corps. The 16th Infantry told the Division that their panels were out. The Division told V Corps, "Just had a strafing job by two P-47s with an Me-109. P-47s had German markings definitely." The 16th Infantry said at 1540^A, "Have we any British planes working on this area? If we do, there is a British Typhoon around 'I' Company. Can you do something about it?"

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At 1550^A, Division A, tillery told the Division Headquarters, "The 134th AAA reported around 1300^A two P-47s and one P-51 strafed the road down there. Had red hub around engine cowling and on the top of it enemy crosses and underneath friendly markings. They were not our planes." By 1610^A, the 18th Infantry had reported that Company "M" had knocked down a FW-190 by machine gun fire; the plane was hit and started to burn, landing out of the regimental area. The 2d Infantry Division told the 1st US Infantry Division at 1625^A that they were putting a unit on the hill on the left of the 26th Infantry.

At 1626, the 26th Infantry reported, "Saw some additional tanks out there, making a total of 37 KO'd. Soldbuhs on enemy dead show the 9th Company, 25th PGR. We may be pulling a raid in the town of BULLINGEN tonight." V Corps told the Division at 1735^A, "We just heard from First Army that 500 enemy planes are supposed to be over tonight for bombing this general area."

The Division told Task Force Davisson at 1740^A, "MALMEDY bombed this afternoon by friendly aircraft and would like to get reconnaissance from your unit to find out what the situation is. It will be a night reconnaissance, but it should be easy to find because it is all lit up." Task Force Davisson replied that they were running contact patrols every two hours from 1700^A to 0800^A. At 1752^A, the 16th Infantry reported that Company "K" was relieving Company "L" about 1900 A.

The 26th Infantry reported at 1755^A, "Enemy tanks from 939010. Enemy personnel approaching from 935012. Numerous tanks heard moving in the town." At 1900, all units were told, "Anti-aircraft measures against aircraft will be taken by AA units only. Individual or separate guns will not fire unless plane commits actual hostile act. Personal arms will not be fired under any circumstance."

Task Force Davisson reported at 1903^A, "The town of MALMEDY is 'kaput'. 30 killed and 20 wounded of the 120th Infantry. Don't believe panels were displayed. Town is in flames. Knocked out very few communications. Bulldozers clearing the streets now. Will pull my contact patrol back so they won't have to go through the town. It has not affected defenses of the area." At 1908^A, the 26th Infantry notified the Division that our artillery fire had quieted the tanks down (believed to be assault guns) and the infantry was dispelled. The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) was told at 2000^A that their Company "B" would be attached to Combat Team 16.

The 16th Infantry was also told that when Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion would arrive, it would be attached to them.

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V Corps told the Division by teletype at 2020A that effective 241630^A December the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company "C" and one Reconnaissance Platoon, was relieved from attachment to the 1st US Infantry Division and would assemble in the vicinity of SOURBRODT; further instructions would be issued later. Another teletype from V Corps stated that effective 241630^A December Company "B" and one Reconnaissance Platoon, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the 1st US Infantry Division. At 2144A, the 2d Infantry Division agreed to continue to loan of the 4.2 inch mortars to the 26th Infantry for supporting missions until the situation should clear.

Division Artillery reported that the 639th Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 1st US Infantry Division as of 241800^A. Based on reports of vehicular movement through FAYMONVILLE (890026), the 7th, 32d, and 955th Field Artillery Battalions participated in a TOT shoot on that town at 231830^A. Indications of heavy movement and a possible threat in front of the 30th Infantry Division on our right moved their Division Artillery to call on us for assistance in night harassing. In response to this request, the 5th, 7th, and 32d Field Artillery Battalions fired 500 rounds in the towns of THIRIMONT (833001), LIGNEUVILLE (807985), during the night in addition to their own normal fire. An unidentified type reconnaissance aircraft which was flying around the Division sector was fired upon by the 103d Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion at 232310A after authority had been obtained from Corps to shoot at any Cub-type of plane flying at night; the plane caught on fire and was last seen falling in the vicinity of the woods southwest of ELSENBORN. Heavy harassing fire was placed at 891023 at 0335A on the basis of a 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry patrol having received considerable small arms fire and resistance in that area. Patrol information received from the 16th Infantry resulted in fire being placed on enemy personnel at 847002.

Division Artillery also told Division Headquarters that upon basis of continued traffic going south from FAYMONVILLE, the 5th Field Artillery Battalion placed additional interdiction fire on the roads in the towns of FAYMONVILLE, HEINBACH, and ONDERAL, beginning at 1135A. At 1515A, the Division Artillery air observation post adjusted on heavy enemy traffic at 888962, bringing in the 5th, 955th, and 200th Field Artillery Battalion. EIBERTINGEN (877970) was interdicted by the 33d Field Artillery Battalion and the 134th Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion (A) at 1600. An enemy battery at 888955 was located and fired on by the 955th Field Artillery Battalion at 1655A after which no more activity was reported. Thirty minutes before an infantry patrol was scheduled to investigate the area, a 2-battalion TOT was fired at 1730A.

It was reported that from 231600A to 241600A, Division artillery, attached and supporting units fired 246 missions. Of these, 8 were on tanks, 45 were interdiction, 31 were on infantry, 37 on vehicles, 21 on enemy guns, 72 were harassing, 1 was illumination, 16 were registrations, and 15 were miscellaneous.

The 134th Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion (A) calimed they probably destroyed 3 enemy aircraft. The 103d Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion reported that they had fired on 1 ME-109 flying at 300 feet on 241229A; the enemy aircraft was engaged in a dog-fight with friendly fighters and dove down to a low altitude in order to escape; the enemy plane flew over the Division area at high speed and disappeared to the north. At 241450A, the 103d Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion fired at one P-47 which was strafing at 300 feet; the P-47 strafed in the vicinity of K-8610, making three passes over the area. Batteries "A", "B", and "C" fired parachute flares to warn the plane of the presence of friendly installations. One water-cooled machine gun and two half-tracks opened fire on the plane's third strafing attack. The plane bore allied markings.

Company "A", 86th Chemical Battalion was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division as of 241220A. The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that one squad of Company "A" was guarding the bridge at K-856067, prepared to place demolitions if necessary; Company "A" extended a hasty mine field from the vicinity of K-872038 to K-875038, laying 810 mines; furnished technical supervision for the 16th Infantry in constructing double apron fencing. Company "B" laid a hasty mine field from the vicinity of 903031 to 903030, laying 650 mines. Company "C" extended a hasty mine field from K-934018 to K-937022 and from K-922022 to K-924024, laying 1800 mines.

(1) The situation at the close of 24 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18 - 31 December 1944, Inclusive.

g. 25 DEcember 1944

At 0025A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that "G" Company had another attack on their outpost, but it was repulsed after a mortar barrage. At 0600A, the 18th Infantry stated that a patrol from Company "C" went to 902018 and found the enemy road block, previously reported there, was gone. V Corps told the Division at 0930^A that the route of the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion was from N-37 to VERVIERS, from there on an unnumbered route to THEUX, west from THEUX, then south on N-32 to REMOUCHAMPS, N-33 to AYWHILLE, south to their destination at WERBOMONT; the Battalion was to leave at 1300A. The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion was given this information.

By 1040^A, the Division Air Support Party Officer had reported that planes in our area would consist of Typhoons, Tempests, Spitfires, P-38s, P-47s, and P51s. At 1237A, the Division told V Corps, "Report from 103d Anti-aircraft Artillery. Three FW-190s were chasing a P-51. Three FWs shot down; also P-51. We got them all. Pilot of the O-51 was dead". The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion told the Division

at 1247A that they would cross the initial point at 1300A. The Division gave V Corps this information and also told Corps that we had not yet seen Company "A", 86th Chemical Battalion.

At 1250A, the 16th Infantry told Division Headquarters that Company "A", 86th Chemical Battalion just reported in. V Corps was given this information. At 1410^A, V Corps told the Division, "First Army is taking the Company 'A' of the 86th Chemical Battalion; like them to return immediately to the battalion assembly area where they came from this morning. Tell them to let us know when they get there." The Division immediately gave this information to the Chemical Company. The Division gave the 2d Infantry Division the information concerning Company "A", 86th Chemical Battalion and stated that the 1st US Infantry Division would like to have the same arrangement on Company "C", 86th Chemical Battalion as was previously had, a loan for supporting missions. The 2d Infantry Division agreed. At 1528A, the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion was told to have someone check on the dam that Task Force Davisson was guarding; the Commanding Officer of Task Force Davisson had called and recommended that the water in the dam be dropped about 8 to 12 feet.

At 1717A, V Corps told the Division, "The status of the 134th AA depends upon your Headquarters whether they are to be used in an AA role or AT. In the event that they be used in the capacity of AA, they would move back to a vicinity southwest of WUPEN." The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported at 1730A that the dam had been opened and it would take 3 days for the water to go down 12 feet; the engineers recommended that it be taken down 10 meters, which would take 7 days.

V Corps was told at 1800A that the Division believed the 134th Anti-aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion would be better in an anti-aircraft role. The 18th Infantry stated at 2005A, "Getting a little more shelling than usual tonight. They are firing artillery air bursts in our area and it looks like an artillery build-up." At 2046^A, the 16th Infantry said, "Mines laid in front of the 2d Battalion, 'E' Company, had good results - one truck blown up." At 2121A, V Corps told the Division that friendly planes always notify the anti-aircraft people when taking pictures at night; if there were no notification, they would be shot down." A plane was reported at 2330A as strafing near Company "M", 16th Infantry.

The 16th Infantry reported that Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion had relieved elements of the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion at 1230^A and was attached to Combat Team 16. Company "C", 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion and one Reconnaissance Platoon were attached to Combat Team 26 as of 250800A.

Division Artillery reported that 9 TOTs were fired from 241800A to 241825A, including all organic artillery, in addition to the 955th and 200th Field Artillery Battalions, on THIRIMONT (8300), MONTENAU (8596), IVEDELDIGEN (8697), EIBERTINGEN (8797), AMEL (8896), HEPSCHEIDE (9298), HEPLENBACH (9297), HELENFELD (9296), and MONSFELD (9699); enemy installations and traffic points had been reported in each of these areas.

The infantry reported at 242345A that at a strong point west of BULLINGEN, "Jerry" was having a musicale, voice and instrument; the song played was "Germany Controls the World". A TOT fired at 242355A by the 33d and 955th Field Artillery Battalions added another note.

The enemy flak battery that shot down two of our bombers was located by the 955th Field Artillery Battalion air observation post at 995990; the 200th Field Artillery Battalion fired at 1555A neutralizing the battery. The air observation post estimated a heavy enemy flak concentration at the northwest edge of AMEL and the north edge of MIRFEID (9096). The 200th Field Artillery Battalion was adjusted on one battery.

It was also reported that from 241600A to 251600A, Division Artillery attached and supporting units fired 248 missions; of these, 37 were on enemy batteries, 52 on infantry, 15 on tanks, 1 on mortars, 52 on interdiction, 18 on vehicles, 13 on registrations, 55 on harassing, 3 on observation posts, and 2 miscellaneous. The 639th Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was still attached to the 1st US Infantry Division and the relief would not be effected until 26 December.

The 639th Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion reported that they fired at 3 FW-190s which were strafing at 200 to 1000 feet; one plane was shot down and crashed in the vicinity of K-9207. The 103d Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion reported that at 251205A they had fired at 8 FW-190s at 1000 to 2000 feet; the enemy aircraft, attempting to escape from a dog fight with Allied planes flew over the Division headed for enemy lines. One FW-190 made an unsuccessful pass at a Piper Cub. Three of the enemy aircraft were calimed as destroyed with one crash located at K-920075 (pilot dead), one crash located at k-978092 (pilot parachuted to earth and was captured), and one crash was located at approximately K-925035.

The 103d Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion reported that a P-51 was damaged while engaged in a dog fight with enemy planes. In attempting to land in the Division area, the pilot flew over the area at tree top height at the same time the FW-190s were being engaged. An undetermined number of .50 caliber machine guns engaged the plane, causing it to crash, resulting in the death of the pilot.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that Company "A" removed the guard from the bridge at K-856067; extended a hasty mine field from K-837018 to K-835020, laying 450 mines; furnished non-commissioned officers and one officer for technical supervision of double apron fencing by the 16th Infantry. Company "B" extended a hasty mine field from K-908033 to K-921028, laying 2178 mines, Company "C" filled bomb craters on the ELSNBORN-BUTGENBACH road, using an R-4 bulldozer; dug-in tanks and excavated a command post for the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, using a D-7 bulldozer; cut 1500 logs for the 26th Infantry for fortifications; and placed 15 anti-tank mines in an enemy tank road at the intersection at K-922017. This road block of Company "C" was within the enemy lines and was not marked; it was not covered by fire. All companies of the engineer battalion were making a reconnaissance of the obstacles as designated by Corps overlay and plans were made to execute them when necessary.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve defensive positions, using mines and barbed wire. Patrols were active to maintain enemy contact and contact with adjacent units. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left. No ground was lost.

(1) The situation at the close of 25 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18 - 31 December 1944, Inclusive.

h. 26 December 1944

At 0025A, Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion was reported at 868055. The 18th Infantry told the Division, "There are now 6 or 8 dead enemy in front of Company 'G' and 8 more were mortared trying to reach them." At 0214A, the 16th Infantry reported, "The Company 'E' outpost saw enemy who they thought wanted to surrender, but on closer observation noticed two more enemy behind the first with burp guns. There are now three dead Germans. The estimated location of the incident was 853024 along the main road."

By 0408A, the 18th Infantry had reported, "Planes are strafing north of NIDRUM. A Company 'E' patrol returned from 897016, vicinity Hill 216. Found an anti-tank mine field at 898017. Taken under artillery fire and had to return." The 16th Infantry told the Division at 090t that they had laid mines in front of the three battalions last night; an enemy half track had blown up on a mine at 855018. V Corps told the Division at 1153A, "In regards to the 134th Anti-aircraft, there had been a change. Two batteries will remain in your area. These two batteries are also available for artillery fire, but have to get ammunition for that. Any movement on their part will have to come from here."

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At 1417^A, the 33d Field Artillery Battalion told Division Headquarters, "P-47s are strafing our areas. We shot up all of our flares, but they disregard them." V Corps Air told the Division at 1648^A that the Bofor units could fire on 20mm bursts tonight.

At 1850^A, the 16th Infantry told the Division, "Patrols out tonight. Changing 'A' Company and 'C' Company; taking place tonight, about now. Should be finished about 2100^A. We are using the 4.2s to fire on a known enemy outpost on the front." The 18th Infantry stated that 4 combat patrols would be out tonight to try and get a prisoner; also a mine laying patrol would go through the woods to the south to the SCHOPPEN road to lay 6 mines across the road. At 1905^A, the Division told the 134th Anti-aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion that we wanted to tie in with them for anti-aircraft firing.

The 30th Infantry Division was told at 1952^A, "We are going to let the water out of the two lakes through the dams, so in case the Germans decide to blow them, you won't get so much water around your areas." Division Artillery reported that the 939th Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 1st US Infantry Division and Division Artillery at 261430^A; Battery "A", 460th Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division and Division Artillery at 261430^A; the 134th Anti-aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (A) reverted to V Corps control at 261436^A. On the request from the Corps Artillery Officer, the road running through MONDERFELD, LAZERATH, crossroads 0199, to HOLERATH received a total of 400 rounds of harassing and interdiction fire during the night from the 200th Field Artillery Battalion. An enemy vehicle at 252130^A ran over a 16th Infantry mine at 850023. The 7th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon that area, causing one fire and quite a few cries. Zone fire was repeated, obtaining another fire and excellent results.

Division Artillery also said that when smoke was seen in BULLINGEN, a 2-Battalion TOT was fired at 0940^A. An area at 001014, where camp fires were picked up by the 2d Infantry Division Artillery observation post, was fired on by the 200th Field Artillery Battalion. While an artillery reconnaissance plane at 1125^A was being fired through the 200th Field Artillery Battalion on enemy traffic at 837944, an enemy aircraft attacked our plane; the adjusting plane shot down the enemy aircraft and returned to its adjustment. The 7th Field Artillery Battalion air observation post adjusted the 200th Field Artillery Battalion on an enemy battery at 898952, getting one direct hit. Division Artillery also said, "Corps G-2 reported at 1630^A that at the Cr 0199 there was a heavy concentration of armor in the adjacent woods; the 200th Field Artillery Battalion fired 100 rounds in the area."

It was reported that from 251600^A to 261600^A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 275 missions. Of these, 9 were registrations, 36 were on enemy guns, 11 on tanks, 23 on vehicles, 43 on infantry, 6 on observation posts and command posts, 67 on interdictions, 8 on machine

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guns and mortars, 68 on harassing, and 4 were miscellaneous.

The 745th Tank Battalion reported that they had 36 serviceable M-75s, 8 serviceable M-76s, 4 serviceable M-105s, and 18 serviceable light tanks. Of these, the 16th Infantry had 14 M-75s and 2 M-76s; the 18th Infantry had 10 M-75s, 4 M-76s, and 1 M-105; the 26th Infantry has 12 M-75s and 2 M-76s; Task Force Davisson had 3 M-105s and 18 light tanks.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group was in direct support of the battalion. Company "A", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion laid a hasty mine field from the vicinity of K-855027 to K-857033, laying 846 mines; extended a hasty mine field from the vicinity of K-885035 to K-882035, laying 473 mines; laid a hasty mine field at approximately K-835020, laying 500 mines. Company "C" laid 79 anti-tank mines and 30 anti-personnel mines in the vicinity of K0941029; completed filling bomb craters on the ELSENBORN-BUTGENBACH road; completed digging in tanks and tank destroyers for the 26th Infantry; was cutting logs for fortifications for the 26th Infantry; laid a hasty mine field from the vicinity of K-935032 to K-930029, laying 750 mines.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve positions without loss of ground. Patrols were active to maintain enemy contact and contact with adjacent units. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

(1) The situation at the close of 26 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

1. 27 December 1944

At 0412A, the 16th Infantry told the Division, "Shortly after 0100A, one of our listening posts was attacked by a squad of enemy who was wearing white blankets. After an exchange of fire, one of the enemy was believed to have been killed and the enemy withdrew." The 16th Infantry stated at 0925A, "Have an enemy column in the town of SCHOPPEN, coming west. Head is just about in SCHOPPEN now. The vehicles are bumper to bumper." At 1400A, the Division received a letter, subject "Barrier Plan", from V Corps, dated 26 December. This letter stated that the letter, Headquarters V Corps, subject "Barrier Plan", dated 22 December 1944, was rescinded. This new order stated that the attached overlay showed the general location and type of barriers planned as part of the defense of the present V Corps sector; Divisions were responsible for the location, construction, and execution (if necessary) of the barriers shown in their respective sectors forward of line "A".

At 1503^A, the Division told V Corps that P-47s with American markings had strafed and bombed us; we shot up yellow flares, but the American planes paid no attention to them. At 1525^A, all units were sent the following operation priority message: "If planes commit hostile act during hours of darkness, call Madcap 134, through Danger, giving hostile act and location." Task Force Davisson was told, "You have a British pilot bailing out in your area. Let me know when your patrol gets any information."

At 1825^A, Division Headquarters told Division Artillery Headquarters, "Orders from Corps tell us to be careful and pay particular attention to the south and ST VITH - 1937A that they had located the enemy outpost line in front of them and the regiment was destroying them one by one. The regiment also said that they were firing indirect fire with tanks, mortars, and 4.2. The 16th Infantry reported, "Panels do not work very well in the snow - we checked with a Cub. They work better on a truck or other vehicle."

At 1900^A, the following operational priority message was sent to all units; "P-47 planes operated by XIX TAC have distinctive yellow markings on nose and tail. Steps are being taken to see that these pilots are briefed properly. Enemy is not operating P-47 planes. Only AA units will fire at hostile aircraft. Under no conditions will friendly aircraft be engaged."

At 2220A, the Division told the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments, "Received work from Corps that the enemy may attack in the Corps area and, estimated 3 Divisions. Would suggest that you send patrols deep to find out all you can and use your artillery to a good advantage in discouraging any build up." Task Force Davisson was given the above information on the possible enemy attack and was told, "If this attack comes in the morning, pick up the patrols as soon as you get the word so that we tie in very closely with the 120th Infantry." The 16th Infantry reported that the regiment had laid 7000 mines along its front and a listening post was established on the northwest edge of FAYMONVILLE.

The 26th Infantry stated that Company "G" had replaced Company "F" in the line and the latter reverted to a reserve position; a mine field belt in front of the regimental line was complete and some wire had been installed; engineer work was started on the preparation of a secondary line of defense.

Division Artillery reported that three battalions of Division Artillery and two battalions of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery ~~kkkk~~ had fired a TOT on BULLINGEN at 262145A, mixing Pozit and WP shells, fuse quick and delay. An enemy convoy entered SCHOPPEN on the MODERSCHIED road at 0925A to receive a 4-battalion TOT; the enemy traffic was reported by the 16th Infantry; large fires were observed in the town. AT 1132A, a 33d Field Artillery Battalion observation post observed the enemy placing what appeared to be smoke pots at 947007; fire from the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion dispersed the group. The 955th Field Artillery Battalion Cub was shot down at 1134A by an FW-190; the Cub was riddled, the radio damaged, but the observer lost only his bar. At 1400A, the 16th Infantry reported a strong point at 887023 from which they were unable to flush the enemy; the 5th Field Artillery Battalion neutralized an area 400 by 400 yards for one hour in an attempt to persuade the Germans. The 33d Field Artillery Battalion adjusted fire on the enemy detaching at 945013 at 1450A; the 955th Field Artillery Battalion reinforced the fire; several casualties were observed and the enemy dispersed rapidly.

It was reported that from 261600A to 271600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 282 missions; of these, 54 were on enemy guns, 5 on tanks, 32 on vehicles, 26 on interdictions, 30 on infantry, 4 on observation posts, 18 on mortars and machine guns, 20 on registrations, 90 on harassing or interdictory, and 3 markings for air missions.

The 103rd Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion told the Division that at 262125A Batteries "B" and "C" had fired at an unknown enemy aircraft dropping photo flares at 1000 feet. The plane was believed to have crashed at approximately K-8205; the claim was one probably destroyed. At 271100A, Batteries "A", "B", "E", and "D" of the Battalion and Battery "A", 460th Anti-aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion fired at 40 to 50 ME-109s bombing and attacking friendly aircraft at 1000 to 2000 feet. The enemy aircraft came over the area from the southwest, attacked a Piper Cub, dropped several anti-personnel bombs, and did some strafing. One Piper Cub was damaged and one ME-109 was claimed as destroyed; the enemy aircraft crashed at K-919063.

Three fighter-bomber squadrons flew missions for the Division from 0930^A to 1300^A. At 0930^A, the first squadron bombed a bivouac area of vehicles and horse-drawn artillery at 9893; 30 to 50 vehicles were damaged and 3 tanks and a few horse-drawn artillery pieces were probably damaged; the squadron worked over the area one-half hour.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group was still in direct support of the Battalion, Company "A", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion

extended a hasty mine field from K-857033 to K-857034 (south end of field laid by the 20th Engineers on 22 December), laying 150 mines; extended a hasty mine field from K-833022 to K-832021, laying 250 mines (tied in on the east end with a hasty mine field laid by the 16th Infantry Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon); extended a hasty mine field from K-843006 to K-843018, laying 250 mines; extended a hasty mine field from K-875038 to K-877038, laying 232 mines. Company "B" destroyed 5 enemy tanks with destroyed tracks in the vicinity of K-895031 and maintained roads in the Combat Team 18 sector. Company "C" extended a hasty mine field from K-922022 to K-917028, laying 1285 mines; cut logs for fortifications for the 26th Infantry. Company "A" posted roads leading to the Bailey Bridge at K-867061. One R-4 and one D-7 bulldozer were excavating positions for the 134th Anti-aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve its positions without loss of ground. Patrols were active to maintain enemy contact; contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

(1) The situation at the close of 27 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

j. 28 December 1944

At 0545A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that there was quite a bit of activity to the east in the 18th and 26th Infantry sectors. The 26th Infantry stated that the activity the 16th Infantry heard was the 18th Infantry firing on some houses at 894027 and 894022. At 0752A the Division said to the 2d Infantry Division, "Interested in knowing when you are going to put your people back on the ridge that you pulled off this morning. Would like to know the pressure you had there. Like to fire on the hill." The 2d Infantry Division replied, "Heinies up on both flanks of that group with 'burp' guns. Group on that hill called for fire and then pulled back." At 0910A, the 2d Infantry Division told the 1st US Infantry Division that they were planning on retaking that hill sometime this morning.

At 0914A, the 18th Infantry told the Division, "Our patrols couldn't get past Hill 556 (894023). Definitely enemy on the hill - there was last night. We shelled the hill every time our patrols returned. At 919016, enemy contacted there. Shelled the place, followed by a combat patrol." By 1515A, the 2d Infantry Division had told the 1st US Infantry Division that they had a reinforced platoon back on the hill on the left of the 26th Infantry. The 26th Infantry was given this information.

The 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments all reported an increase in enemy artillery fire in their sectors. The 26th Infantry stated that the artillery fire was heavier

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than usual. At 1725A, the Division said to V Corps, "The bomb line as it is now is too close to our front line units. We do not want BULLINGEN included, as we can reach that with artillery. This bomb line is suggested: MODERSCHIED - HOENSFELD - MORENGSEN."

The 26th Infantry reported at 1800A that a patrol from the 3d Battalion left at 1700A for the railroad, met strong resistance and noticed considerable activity; a 2d Battalion patrol found a tank on the road running into their position from the south. The regiment stated that they would put defensive fires on both positions. At 1840A, the 26th Infantry said, "A 2d Battalion radio message states that everything is under control. The 3d Battalion, 'L' Company, is making some advance. They had a group of enemy trapped in the little woods in the vicinity of 'L' and 'I' Companies. They cut off the escape route and it is believed that the enemy is waiting for darkness to initiate an escape." The Division told V Corps and the 9th Infantry Division that the attack on the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry was discouraged by our artillery and the situation with the 3d Battalion was not clear as yet.

The 26th Infantry stated at 2145A, "The show on the 2d Battalion started at 1700A and was preceded by 300 rounds of mortar and artillery on the CP and 'A' and 'F' Companies. We lost one tank and machine gun" The 18th Infantry reported that dummy anti-tank guns were set up in the 1st and 2d Battalion sectors; additional mines were laid and a road block was established by the 2d Battalion. The 26th Infantry stated that an enemy probing attack was made against the Company "L" positions early this morning and all positions were held after the outpost had been temporarily driven back.

Division Artillery reported that information from an overlay captured by a 26th Infantry patrol gave the location of two Nevelwerfer positions, as well as the battalion command post, in the 88 and 99 square. Three battalion TOTs were fired at 0400A this morning on all the locations. Tanks reported in the town of FAYMONVILLE (8702) received three battalion TOTs at three separate points at 1215A. An enemy battery located by sound and flash at 92089911 received a TOT of 300 rounds at 1530A.

It was reported that from 271600A to 281600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 313 missions. Of these, 13 were registrations, 96 on guns, 11 on tanks, 48 on infantry, 5 on vehicles, 6 on observation posts, 25 on interdictions, 74 on harassing, 14 on machine guns and mortars, 1 on a preparation, 5 on strong points,

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and 10 on Nebelwerfers. According to Division Artillery, with poor visibility during the day, the increase in enemy artillery activity could only be fired upon unobserved. All known and many suspected locations were fired repeatedly during the day.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion stated that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group was still in direct support of the Battalion. Company "A", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion extended a hasty mine field from K-943037 to K-940033, laying 810 mines; extended a hasty mine field from K-938017 to K 941025, laying 885 mines; was constructing a command post for the 33d Field Artillery Battalion.

The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) was reported as having 30 operational M010s and 6 repairable M-10s; Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion was reported as having 12 operational M010s.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve positions. Patrols were active to maintain contact with the enemy and with adjacent units. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

(1) The situation at the close of 28 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

k. 29 December 1944.

At 0320A, the 16th Infantry told the Division, "The Company 'G' OP reports approximately a platoon of enemy riding bicycles around 938012. We are placing fire on both roads, as we don't know which way they will turn." At 0945A, V Corps told the Division, "Will set the search lights in the vicinity of EUPEN. Drafting a memo so that battalion commanders will be able to qualify men from units other than AA in recognition so that they can fire on enemy aircraft. If he understands the rules and qualifies in recognition, he will be issued a qualification card stating that he is a qualified gunner."

By 1130A, the Division had received a Top Secret Letter of Instructions, Headquarters V Corps, dated 281500A. This order stated that V Corps would continue to hold the present defensive positions against any enemy attempt to penetrate from the south or east and would be prepared to resume the offensive on Army order. Front line units would utilize every opportunity to improve present positions and to push outposts to locations which would deny close-in mortar positions to the enemy. Patrolling would be aggressive and deep in contact would be maintained with the enemy at all times. Enemy communication lines and supply routes would be continuously harassed and interdicted. Under no conditions would friendly aircraft be fired upon. In case friendly aircraft should strafe or bomb friendly troops, immediate

telephonic report would be made to the G-3 Air, Headquarters V Corps, and a written report with all the details would be forwarded within twenty-four (24) hours.

This Letter of Instructions also said that V Corps was holding the key sector on the northern flank of the break-through. The order said, "The splendid efforts of the men and officers that have stabilized our present lines and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy are recognized and appreciated."

At 1645A, the 16th Infantry told the Division that they were interdicting roads in the vicinity of AMEL and had started some fires; the regiment was using 90-mm guns. At 2312A, the 18th Infantry reported, "Detected considerable flare activity to our right front. Checked with the 16th Infantry and they reported throwing a lot of 60-mm illuminating shells up." The 16th Infantry reported that Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion fired 960 rounds of harassing fire at the rate of 120 rounds per hour on MODERSCHIED, HEPPENBACH, MIRFELD, and EIBERTINGEN.

Division Artillery reported that BULLINGEN, where activity was observed at 281805A, received a concentration of two battalions from the 2d Infantry Division Artillery and two from the 1st US Infantry Division Artillery at 281820A. At 281834A, the 5th, 32nd, and 200th Field Artillery Battalions fired a TOD on an enemy battery at 87289734; the location was determined by sound and flash and was claimed to be accurate ~~xxxxx~~ to 50 yards. The 32nd air observation post adjusted on an enemy battery at 88339928. The 5th, 32nd, and 200th Field Artillery Battalions massed their guns on that point at 1510A; the air observation post reported that the area was completely covered. A convoy of 15 vehicles going to HEPPENBACH was fired upon by the 955th Field Artillery Battalion at 1525A; three vehicles were set on fire and a fire was started in the nearby woods. A sound and flash location of an enemy battery at 87280000 was fired upon just prior to dusk by the 5th, 7th, and 32nd Field Artillery Battalions. The Division Artillery air observation post observed the effect, which included several explosions, but sensed the mass of fire 100 yards short. The concentration, with the observed sensing, was refired at 1800A.

It was reported that from 281600A to 291600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 264 missions; of these, 46 were counter-battery, 33 on infantry, 17 on vehicles, 15 on tanks, 25 on interdictions, 10 on machine guns and mortars, 3 on observation posts, 13 registrations, 95 harassing, 4 on VEBELWERFERS, 2 on preparation, and 1 miscellaneous.

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The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group was still in direct support of the battalion. Company "A", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion was fencing mine fields; was maintaining roads in the Combat Team 16 sector. Company "B" was fencing mine fields and completed the log tank obstacles at K-916026 and K-918029 for Combat team 18, attaching two anti-personnel mines to the obstacles at K-916026. Company "C" completed the command post for the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, using an R-4 bulldozer; was constructing a command post for the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, using an R-4 Bulldozer; laid 29 anti-personnel mines in the vicinity of K-943041 to K-943038; was fencing mine fields. Plans were completed and explosive was being placed at Barriers Number 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, and 38A.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve its positions. Patrols were active to maintain enemy contact and combat with adjacent units. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

The situation at the close of 29 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

1. 30 December 1944

At 0020A, the 18th Infantry reported, "Companies 'B' and 'G' received a very heavy concentration of heavy rockets. A patrol reported that at 902019 a lot of activity was heard - tanks, infantry, and motorcycles - south of them in those woods." The 26th Infantry stated at 0107A that they had received a small barrage of Nebelwerfer fire in the town. The 16th Infantry reported at 0730A that one enemy tank was moving around in FAYMONVILLE and our artillery was placed on it. The 18th Infantry stated that an enemy patrol, attempting to probe the Company "B" position, ran into our booby traps and withdrew leaving one of their party dead in our wire.

By 1600A, Company "F", 26th Infantry was reported as having relieved Company "E", 26th Infantry and the latter reverted to the reserve positions formerly occupied by Company "F". At 1625A, the 18th Infantry stated that one 12-man patrol was going out tonight from Company "K" to 904025; Company "I" was sending a 12-man patrol to 918017. The regiment said, "Both patrols will leave at 2100A and return at 310100A. Will lay wire for communication. Both are ambush patrols. The 1st and 2d Battalions will increase their OPs and attempt to ambush enemy coming into our lines." At 2049A, the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments were informed that 200 friendly aircraft were flying over the Division area sometime tonight.

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At 2223^A, the 26th Infantry reported, "Made two changes. Replaced Company "C" with Company "B" and replaced Company "I" with Company "K". Put in 1600 mines and a few more APs." By midnight it was reported that Company "L", 16th Infantry had taken over the Company "I" front line positions and Company "I" was moving back to the former reserve position of Company "L".

Division Artillery told Division Headquarters that at 291800^A the Division Artillery air observation post had reported that our planes had flown as far as two miles beyond our front line in the Division sector without drawing anti-aircraft fire. Last night the 7th Field Artillery Battalion reported a column of tracked vehicles on the road leading into FAYMONVILLE from the southeast in the vicinity of 870014. Later in the evening, heavy interdiction fires were put on the road and at the entrances of the town by the 5th, 7th, 32nd, 941st, and 987th Field Artillery Battalions; within a few minutes, one fire was started and the movement ceased. Not long afterward, traffic was reported in BULLINGEN, and a similar interdiction was placed on that town by the 32nd, 33rd and 955th Field Artillery Battalions.

Division Artillery also stated that at 0045A, the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion reported that an 18th Infantry patrol had received fire from the vicinity of 903020; the patrol also reported that some vehicles, possible tanks were heard, and enemy infantry was active, at 895017. The 5th, 7th, and 32nd Field Artillery Battalions fired on these points and on some others in searching missions. From 291600^A to 301600A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 242 missions; of these, 12 were registrations, 36 on counter-battery, 16 on tanks, 18 on vehicles, 44 on infantry, 13 on interdictions, 6 on Nebelwerfers, 1 on a strong point, 80 on harassing, 7 on observation posts, 7 on machine guns and mortars, and 2 were miscellaneous.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group remained in direct support of the battalion. The engineer battalion placed explosives at the sites for Barriers Number 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, 38A, and the Bailey Bridge at K-867061. Company "G" completed the command post for the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry; removed 29 friendly anti-personnel mines previously reported in the vicinity of K-943041 and K-943038.

The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) reported that the Reconnaissance Company was still attached to Tank Force Davisson; the 1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company remained in reserve; the 2d Platoon guarded the road block in LIBOMONT and operated a contact patrol with the 1st and 2d Battalions, 16th Infantry during the night; the 3d Platoon,

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Reconnaissance Company operated contact patrols during the night with the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve its positions. Active patrols were continued to maintain enemy contact and contact with adjacent units. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

(1) The Situation at the close of 30 December is shown in Appendix E - Daily Situation Overlays, 18-31 December 1944, Inclusive.

m. 31 December 1944

At 0456A, the 18th Infantry told the Division, "The combat patrol from 'A' Company hasn't returned as yet. The 26th Infantry asked for permission to fire on some tanks at 926012, but not knowing the position of our patrol, we could not give them permission." At 0715A, the 18th Infantry reported that the combat patrol from Company "A" had moved along the trail leading southeast from the 1st Battalion along the edge of the woods at 918017 where they detected an enemy outpost; the patrol deployed, planning to go and get the, but in the process, spotted 25 more enemy moving in single file back to the same direction from which the first 25 enemy came. At 0500A, the patrol saw eighty (80) enemy marching in a column of fours along the same trail at the road junction and going southeast.

The 18th Infantry continued, "Patrol had an artillery observer with them and they fired two battalions of artillery on the eighty men in the vicinity of 91570190. After the patrol returned, we palstered the whole area with artillery."

At 1600A, the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry was reported to have begun the relief of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, each battalion taking over the other's respective area and mission. The 18th Infantry reported that the relief was completed by 2200A and the 2d Battalion had moved back to the former position of the 3d Battalion and was now in Division reserve. The 26th Infantry reported that additional mine fields were laid in the 3d Battalion area and more barbed and concertina wire was erected; log squad shelters were being built for all companies.

Division Artillery reported that the 955th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 1st US Infantry Division Artillery as of 20 December. Between 1200A and 1300A, experiments were conducted with proximity fuses; the results had not yet been

tabulated. During the afternoon, vehicular and tank activity was observed entering SCHOPPEN from the southeast. The 5th, 7th, 32nd, 33rd, 955th, and 200th Field Artillery Battalions participated in a TOT on that town at 1607 A.

It was reported that from 301600^A to 311600^A, Division Artillery, attached and supporting units fired 158 missions; of these, 10 were on counter-battery, 1 on vehicles, 1 on tanks, 22 on infantry, 18 on interdiction, 4 on observation posts, 1 on machine guns and mortars, 3 on strong points, 80 harassing, 9 on registrations, and 9 were miscellaneous.

The 745th Tank Battalion reported 38 serviceable M-75s, 9 serviceable M76s, 5 serviceable M-105s and 18 serviceable light tanks. Of these, the 16th Infantry had 14 M-75s and 2 M-76s; the 18th Infantry had 10 M-75s, 4 M-76s, and 1 M-105; the 26th Infantry had 14 M-75s, 3 M-76s, and 1 M-105; Tank Force Davisson had 3 M-105s and 18 light tanks. Tank Force Davisson continued to secure the dam in the vicinity of WALK and continued to maintain contact with the 1st and 2d Battalions, 16th Infantry and the 120th Infantry on the right.

The 1st Engineer Combat Battalion reported that the 1171st Engineer Combat Group was still in direct support of the Battalion. Company "A", 1st Engineer Combat Battalion extended a hasty mine field from K-843018 to K-849020, laying 600 mines. Company "C" extended a hasty mine field from K-941025 to K-940033, laying 1600 mines; cut 325 logs for fortifications for the 26th Infantry and laid 32 anti-personnel mines in the vicinity of K-941032.

The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-propelled) was reported as having 33 operational and 3 repairable M-10s. Company "B", 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion was reported as having 12 operational M-10s. Company "C", 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion was reported as having 12 operational M-10s.

The 1st US Infantry Division continued to consolidate and improve its positions and held these positions without loss of ground. Patrols were active to maintain enemy contact. Contact was maintained with the 30th Infantry Division on the right and the 2d Infantry Division on the left.

(1) The situation at the close of 31 December is shown in Appendix E- Daily Situation Overlays, 18 - 31 December 1944, Inclusive.

II. CONCLUSIONS

1. An attack in open country two hours before daylight, preceded by extensive patrols to locate the enemy positions and supported by artillery and tanks, was used to seize LUCHEM. The artillery fire drove the enemy into the cellars and the direct tank fire and the infantry forced them to surrender or be killed. Coordination with supporting weapons is of vital importance.

2. Immediately after seizing its objective the infantry "tied in" with its supporting weapons to defend the captured area. Such tying-in must be done immediately after a key point has been seized.

3. After the ground has been seized, it must be immediately consolidated and improved by using barbed wire and minefields covered by fire. Patrols must be active and aggressive to the front and flanks to maintain contact with the enemy and adjacent units. Contact with adjacent units must be maintained to prevent enemy infiltration through our positions.

4. If a mechanized cavalry group is securing a flank, patrols must be maintained day and night between the group and adjacent infantry units. The group should be attached to a combat infantry division and must have constant contact with the division command post, preferably by telephone.

5. If attacked by infantry supported by tanks, units must be prepared to permit the tanks to break through to be taken care of by the normal tank destroyer weapons in rear of the front line positions and to defeat the following enemy infantry at the front lines.

6. Anti-tank guns capable of knocking out enemy tanks must be in close support of infantry battalions.

7. Mass artillery fire was again shown to be effective. When the 26th Infantry, defending the sector between BUTGENBACH and BULLINGEN was attacked by the 12th SS Division on 20-23 December, the enemy tanks were "palstered" by our massed artillery and those that broke through were knocked out by our infantry; approximately 37 enemy tanks were knocked out.

8. After two rounds have been fired, the 57-mm gun position is disclosed by the muzzle flash.

/s/CLARENCE E. BECK
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
A.C. of B., G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U.S. Army

Authority:CG
1 Jan 1945 Div:
Initials:N.F.E.

1 January 1945

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(1 Dec 1944 to 31 Dec 1944)

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2. ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH (16 December - 31 December)

a. The Big Picture

(1) On 16 December, the enemy, implementing a capability which had existed since the start of the Allied drive on the Rhine, launched a high-geared, meticulously-planned counterattack on the center of the American line between MONSCHAU and ECHTERNACH. The ultimate objectives of this drive are still not clear: it is probable that the operation was designed as a monumental spoiling attack cutting off the Allied supply port of ANTWERP and communications center of BRUSSELS. In any case, the German people and the Wehrmach were promised LIEGE and the Meuse, and in the PW cages during the early days there was considerable high talk of PARIS for Christmas. One of the primary objectives of the attack was the seizure of the enormous American supply dumps in the LIEGE, VERVIERS and EUPEN area; in fact, the continued impetus of the drive hinged on the capture of these supplies. Certainly the thrust was far more than a local counter-pressure; if its success could not win the war for the enemy, at least it could delay the Allies' winning for a depressing length of time.

(2) The enemy's plan for the blow was carefully thought out and carefully disguised (See Annex 1). He picked the terrain -- and unlikely spot and therefore lightly held. He waited for the weather, and for the first week his operations were blanketed in baffling fog. He built up enough supplies to catapult the initial momentum. And he gathered up all his strategic reserves, including the Sixth SS Panzer Army, and drove them through in a gamble that was far from unreasonable. Furthermore, beyond the normal means at his command he used every deception and surprise element he could conceive, labelling them collectively "Operation GREIF".

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THE BREAKTHROUGH (16 Dec-31 Dec 44)
(1st Inf Division)

The German counteroffensive against the First U. S. Army, 16 December 1944-14 January 1945, was divided into several types of action. At some points there was steady withdrawal under enemy armored thrusts, at other points isolated garrisons held their positions while the battle swept around them, while at other fronts key road positions were held by the rapid reinforcement of positions with infantry and massed artillery. It was the latter type of action in which the 1st Infantry Division engaged in the area of Butgenbach ^{and} Weismes during the period beginning 17 December.

The First Division, after participating in the campaign to reach the Roer River in late November and early December, was relieved of this mission on 5 December. The 16th CT passed under the operational control of V Corps and relieved the 60th CT on the Monschau front. The 26th CT was relieved on 6 December by elements of the 9th Division and went to rest area at Aubel, Belgium, while the 18th CT was relieved on 8 December by units of the same division and went into quarters near Plombiers, Belgium. The 16th (less the 2d Bn) was relieved by the 28th Div on 11 December and went into rest area near Verviers, where it was joined on 13 December by the 2d Battalion. Under the control of VII Corps these units engaged in training and recreational activities until the 16 December (Rgtl Histories, 16th, 18th, 26th).

On 16 December, following announcement of

of the German breakthrough in Belgium and Luxembourg, VII Corps issued an order placing the 26th CT on a six hour alert ready for movement to the breakthrough area. That evening the 16th Infantry was placed on a four hour alert, while the 33d Field Artillery Battalion was placed on one hour call. The 26th CT was then warned to be ready to move at midnight by way of Aubel and Verviers to Elsenborn. By 2250 the 18th CT was also alerted for movement and the 26th was told to start moving at 2400 ~~xxxxxx~~ to Camp Elsenborn where it would come under the control of V Corps. At the same time the 16th CT was returned by V Corps to VII Corps and 1st Division control (1st Div After Action Report, Dec 44, pages 1-19).

~~xxxxxx~~
The 26th Infantry began its march at 0230 on

17 December and closed at the assembly area near Camp Elsenborn at 0900. The 2d Battalion, which was to catch the brunt of the German attack, was sent into this action in a depleted condition. In the Hurtgen Forest action two Companies, E and F, had been knocked out completely and Company G had been hard hit. Since there had not been sufficient time to bring the units up to full strength Companies E and F went into action with approximately 100 men each, while Co G was sent forward with only 50. Except for eight men two of the heavy machine gun platoons were completely new, while there were only seven old officers in the battalion. Shortages of BAR's and grenade launchers existed, although the battalion had all of its heavy weapons. The regiment itself had only about 2500 strength. (Statement of Capt Gendron, S-3, 2d Bn, 26th Inf, in interview)

As soon as the 26th Infantry began moving the 16th CT was ordered to ^{be} ~~move~~ ^{prepared to} move to the vicinity of Camp Elsenborn. The 1st Division moved its CP to 873093 in the vicinity of Sourbrodt ~~and~~ at 2000 on 17 December and was ~~there~~ attached to V Corps (1st Div After Action Report, Dec 44).

3 1st Div

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On reaching Camp Elsenborn, the 26th Infantry was attached to the 99th Division, which was being heavily hit by the German attack. It was decided that the 26th CT was to hold positions near Butgenbach, so the regimental commander ordered the second battalion to go through that town to the high ground at 928027 and 940026. The 3d Battalion was to occupy the high ground to the north of the 2d, while the 1st Battalion was to remain in Elsenborn with the 33d FA Bn to its right (1st Div After Action Rpt; 26th Regimental History).

Outside Elsenborn ~~the units of~~ the 26th Infantry encountered small groups of parachutists, but was not held up in its advance to Butgenbach. After Butgenbach was reached, the 26th was sent through the town along the main road towards Dom Butgenbach. At the first high ground along the road they found approximately 50 clerks and other personnel of the 99th Division under the command of a tank destroyer officer. He indicated that the Germans were coming up the road, but was told to hold his position until the 2d Battalion could pass through. [The officers of the 2d Bn say that the captain came back three times wanting to withdraw. We were told later at the Anti-tank section, 99th Division, that the man was Capt. Kennedy of a TD Bn who had been recommended for a Silver Star for stopping the Germans along this road. They claimed that the 99th deserved credit for saving Butgenbach.] See suggested citation.

Company G of the 2d Battalion ~~xxxx~~ led the way in the advance towards Dom Butgenbach. It occupied the high ground approximately at 937022. while Co F took up positions to the south of G Company and Co E secured the position south of Dom Butgenbach (see overlay). There was no infantry opposition to

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this action by the Germans, who had failed to move from Bullingen quickly enough to bar the 26th from these positions. (It is possible that artillery fire may have been responsible for this delay).

The movement had begun from Elsenborn at 1200. The battalion reached Dom Butgenbach at 1300 and was established in positions at 1700. Anti-tank guns (57 MM) were set up on the roads to the south and east. The battalion was also supported by four M-10 tank destroyers from the 2d platoon, Co A, 634th TD Battalion and by tanks of the 2d platoon, Company C, 745th Tank Battalion (Interview with 2d Bn, 26th).

~~On the 16th CT front the 2d Battalion, which was to reinforce the 99th Division, occupied positions south of the road junction near Malmedy. The first battalion was south of the town and the 3d battalion was southwest of that position.~~

In the meantime the intentions of the enemy were made a little clearer and more complete plans of defense were made. By 2105 the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion of the 5th Armored Division had come up to reinforce the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at Mutzenich, while Monschau was reported clear of the enemy. One CT of the 30th Division was moving through the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, to Malmedy, and the 18th CT was brought up east of Eupen to reinforce the 47th. The 18th CT was informed that as many as 500-700 paratroopers had been dropped at K-8116 and was ordered to mop up these forces. The 5th FA Bn, which was being brought up to support the 1st Division, was slowed down by enemy strafing, but the 33d FA Bn was firing on enemy forces, estimated to be as large as a division, between 965991-925986-964993 (1st Div After Action Report, Dec 44).

By the end of 17 December the extent of the German ^{and further}